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Abstract: Many anonymous communication networks
(ACNs) with different privacy goals have been devel-
oped. However, there are no accepted formal definitions
of privacy and ACNs often define their goals and ad-
versary models ad hoc. However, for the understanding
and comparison of different flavors of privacy, a common
foundation is needed. In this paper, we introduce an
analysis framework for ACNs that captures the notions
and assumptions known from different analysis frame-
works. Therefore, we formalize privacy goals as notions
and identify their building blocks. For any pair of no-
tions we prove whether one is strictly stronger, and, if
so, which. Hence, we are able to present a complete hi-
erarchy. Further, we show how to add practical assump-
tions, e.g. regarding the protocol model or user corrup-
tion as options to our notions. This way, we capture the
notions and assumptions of, to the best of our knowl-
edge, all existing analytical frameworks for ACNs and
are able to revise inconsistencies between them. Thus,
our new framework builds a common ground and allows
for sharper analysis, since new combinations of assump-
tions are possible and the relations between the notions
are known.
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1 Introduction
With our frequent internet usage of, e.g., social net-
works, instant messaging, and web browsing, we con-
stantly reveal personal data. Content encryption can
reduce the footprint, but metadata (e.g. correspon-
dents’ identities) still leaks. To protect metadata
from state and industrial surveillance, a broad vari-
ety of anonymous communication networks (ACNs) has
emerged; one of the most deployed is Tor [10], but also
others, e.g. I2P [17] or Freenet [9], are readily avail-
able. Additionally, many conceptual systems, like Mix-
Nets [8], DC-Nets [6], Loopix [15] and Crowds [16] have
been published.
The published ACNs address a variety of privacy
goals. However, many definitions of privacy goals are
ad hoc and created for a particular use case. We be-
lieve that a solid foundation for future analysis is still
missing. This hinders the understanding and compari-
son of different privacy goals and, as a result, compar-
ison and improvement of ACNs. In general, comparing
privacy goals is difficult since their formalization is of-
ten incompatible and their naming confusing. This has
contributed to a situation where existing informal com-
parisons disagree: e.g., Sender Unlinkablity of Hevia and
Micciancio’s framework [13] and Sender Anonymity of
AnoA [3] are both claimed to be equivalent to Sender
Anonymity of Pfitzmann and Hansen’s terminology [14],
but significantly differ in the protection they actually
provide. These naming issues further complicate under-
standing of privacy goals and hence analysis of ACNs.
To allow rigorous analysis, i.e. provable privacy, of
ACNs, their goals need to be unambiguously defined.
Similar to the notions of semantic security (like CPA,
CCA1, CCA2 [4]) for confidentiality, privacy goals can
be formally defined as indistinguishability games. We
call such formally defined privacy goals privacy no-
tions. Further, notions need to be compared according
to their strength: achieving the stronger notion implies
the weaker one. Comparison of notions, and of the ACNs
achieving them, is otherwise impossible. To understand
the ramifications of privacy goals, we aim at setting all
notions into mutual relationships. This means for ev-
ery pair of notions it must be clear if one is stronger
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or weaker than the other, or if they have no direct re-
lationship. Such a comparison has already been made
for the notions of semantic security [4]. Further, all the
assumptions of different existing analysis frameworks,
e.g. regarding corruption or specific protocol parts like
sessions, have to be unified in one framework to find a
common basis for the comparison.
In this work, we introduce such a unified frame-
work. To achieve this, we build on the foundations of
existing analytical frameworks [3, 5, 11, 13]. With their
preparatory work, we are able to present basic build-
ing blocks of privacy notions: observable properties of
a communication, that (depending on the notion) must
either be protected, i.e. kept private, by the protocol, or
are permitted to be learned by the adversary. Defining
our notions based on the idea of properties simplifies
comparison. Further, we map practitioners’ intuitions
to their underlying formal model, justify our choice of
notions with exemple use cases for each, and make a san-
ity check to see that the privacy goals of a current ACN
(Loopix [15]) are covered. As a next step, we include as-
sumptions of existing analysis frameworks by defining
them similarly as building blocks that can be combined
to any notion. Finally, we argue how the notions and
assumptions of existing works map to ours.
We compare all identified privacy notions and
present a complete proven hierarchy. As a consequence
of our comparison, we are able to rectify mapping in-
consistencies of previous work and show how privacy
notions and data confidentiality interact. Furthermore,
the proofs for building the hierarchy include templates
in order to compare and add new privacy notions to
the established hierarchy, if necessary. As we added the
assumptions, our resulting framework captures all the
assumptions and notions of the AnoA [3], Hevia and
Miccianchio’s [13], Gelernter and Herzberg’s [11] frame-
works, captures most and adapts some of Bohli and
Pashalidis’s framework [5] and adds missing ones. We
capture the assumptions and notions of the other frame-
works by demonstrating equivalences between their and
our corresponding notion. This removes the constraints
of co-existing frameworks and allows to use all options
when analyzing an ACN. To make our work more acces-
sible, we included a how-to-use section and intuitions,
recommendations and limits of this work in the discus-
sion.
In summary, our main contributions are:
– a holistic framework for analyzing ACNs, capturing
more notions and assumptions than each existing
framework,
– the mapping of practitioners’ intuitions to game-
based proofs,
– the definition of building blocks for privacy notions,
– the selection and unified definition of notions,
– a complete hierarchy of privacy notions, which sim-
plifies comparison of ACNs,
– the resolution of inconsistencies and revision of mis-
takes in previous (frame)works
– the definition of building blocks for assumptions
compatible to our notions and
– a guide to use the framework and an example of
mapping the goals of an ACN into our hierarchy.
Outline. Section 2 contains an introductory example
and gives an overview of our paper. In Section 3, we
introduce the underlying model and indistinguishabil-
ity games. In Section 4, we introduce the basic building
blocks of privacy notions: properties. In Section 5, we
define the privacy notions. In Section 6, we argue our
choice of notions. In Section 7, we introduce further as-
sumptions, that can be combined with our notions as
options. In Section 8, we explain how results regarding
restricted adversaries carry over to our work. In Section
9, we state the relation of our notions to the other exist-
ing analytical frameworks. In Section 10, we present the
relations between the notions. In Section 11, we explain
how to use the framework for analysis. In Section 12,
we discuss our results. In Section 13, we conclude our
paper and give an outlook.
2 Overview
We start with an example of a use case and the cor-
responding implicit privacy goal, to then introduce the
idea of the related indistinguishability game. We show
how such a game works and what it means for a proto-
col to be secure according to this goal. Furthermore, by
adopting the game we sketch how privacy goals can be
formalized as notions and provide an intuition for the
relations between different goals.
Example: Alice is a citizen of a repressive regime
and engaged with a resistance group. Despite the
regime’s sanctions on distributing critical content, Alice
wants to publish her latest critical findings. A vanilla en-
cryption scheme would reduce Alice’s potential audience
and thus does not solve her problem. Hence, she needs
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to hide the link between the message and herself as the
sender. We call this goal sender-message unlinkability.1
First attempt. We start by presenting an easy
game, that at first glance looks like the correct formal-
ization for the goal of the example, but turns out to
model an even stronger goal.
For Alice’s safety, the regime should not suspect her
of being the sender of a compromising message, other-
wise she risks persecution. Thus, we need to show for the
applied protection measure, that compared to any other
sender of this message, it is not more probable that Al-
ice is the sender. We analyze the worst case: in a group
of users, let Charlie be a user for whom the probability
of being the sender differs most from Alice’s probabil-
ity. If even these two are too close to distinguish, Alice
is safe, since all other probabilities are closer. Hence,
the regime cannot even exclude a single user from its
suspects.
We abstract this idea into a game2, where the ad-
versary aims to distinguish two “worlds” or scenarios.
These may only differ in the properties the protocol is
required to protect, but within these restrictions the ad-
versary can choose freely, especially the worst case that
is easiest for her to distinguish (e.g. in one scenario Alice
sends the message, in the other Charlie). Fig. 1 shows
such a game.
Challenger Adversary
123
4 5ACN
b
Fig. 1. Steps of the sample game: 1) adversary picks two sce-
narios; 2) challenger checks if scenarios only differ in senders;
3) based on random bit b the challenger inputs a scenario into
the ACN; 4) adversary observes execution; 5) adversary outputs
‘guess’ as to which scenario was executed
What the adversary can observe in step 4 depends
on her capabilities and area of control. A weak adver-
sary may only receive a message from somewhere, or
discover it on a bulletin board. However, a stronger ad-
1 Usually this is called sender anonymity. However, since the
term sender anonymity is overloaded and sometimes also used
with a slightly different meaning, we refer to it as sender-message
unlinkability, as the message should not be linkable to the
sender.
2 Similar to indistinguishability games in cryptology [12].
versary could e.g. also observe the activity on the Inter-
net uplinks of some parties.
The adversary wins the game if she guesses the cor-
rect scenario. If she can devise a strategy that allows her
to win the game repeatedly with a probability higher
than random guessing, she must have learned some in-
formation that is supposed to be protected, here the
sender (e.g. that Alice is more probable the sender of
the message than Charlie), since everything else was
identical in both scenarios. Hence, we say that, if the
adversary can find such a strategy, we do not consider
the analyzed protocol secure regarding the respective
privacy goal.
Why this is too strong. As argued, a proto-
col achieving this goal would help Alice in her use case.
However, if an adversary learns who is sending any mes-
sage with real information (i.e. no random bits/dummy
traffic), she can distinguish both scenarios and wins the
game. As an example, consider the following two sce-
narios: (1) Alice and Bob send messages (2) Charlie and
Dave send messages. If the adversary can learn the ac-
tive senders, she can distinguish the scenarios and win
the game. However, if she only learns the set of active
senders, she may still not know who of the two active
senders in the played scenario actually sent the regime-
critical content. Thus, a protocol hiding the information
of who sent a message within a set of active senders is
good enough for the given example. Yet, it is considered
insecure regarding the above game, since an adversary
can learn the active senders. Hence, the game defines a
goal stronger than the required sender-message unlinka-
bility. As the ACN in this case needs to hide the sending
activity (the adversary does not know if a certain pos-
sible sender was active or not), we call the goal that is
actually modeled sender unobservability.
Correcting the formalization. However, we can
adjust the game of Fig. 1 to model sender-message un-
linkability. We desire that the only information about
the communications that differs between the scenarios
is who is sending which message. Thus, we allow the
adversary to pick scenarios that differ in the senders,
but not in the activity of the senders, i.e. the number
of messages each active sender sends. This means, we
change what the adversary is allowed to submit in step
1 and what the challenger checks in step 2. So, if the ad-
versary now wants to use Alice and Charlie, she has to
use both in both scenarios, e.g. (1) Alice sends the crit-
ical message, Charlie a benign message and (2) Charlie
sends the critical message, Alice the benign message.
Hence, given an ACN where this game cannot be won,
the adversary is not able to distinguish whether Alice
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or another active user sent the regime-critical message.
The adversary might learn, e.g. that someone sent a
regime-critical message and the identities of all active
senders (here that Alice and Charlie are active senders).
However, since none of this is sanctioned in the above
example, Alice is safe, and we say such an ACN provides
sender-message unlinkability.
Lessons learned. Depending on the formalized
privacy goal (e.g. sender unobservability) the scenarios
are allowed to differ in certain properties of the commu-
nications (e.g. the active senders) as we have illustrated
in two exemple games. Following the standard in cryp-
tology, we use the term privacy notion, to describe such
a formalized privacy goal that defines properties to be
hidden from the adversary.
Further, the games used to prove the privacy no-
tions only differ in how scenarios can be chosen by the
adversary and hence what is checked by the challenger.
This also holds for all other privacy notions; they all de-
fine certain properties of the communication to be pri-
vate and other properties that can leak to the adversary.
Therefore, their respective games are structurally iden-
tical and can be abstracted to define one general game,
whose instantiations represent notions. We explain and
define this general game in Section 3. We then define
the properties (e.g. that the set of active senders can
change) in Section 4 and build notions (e.g. for sender
unobservability) upon them in Section 5.
Additionally, we already presented the intuition
that sender unobservability is stronger than sender-
message unlinkability. This is not only true for this ex-
ample, in fact we prove: every protocol achieving sender
unobservability also achieves sender-message unlinkabil-
ity. Intuitively, if whether Alice is an active sender or not
is hidden, whether she sent a certain message or not is
also hidden. We will prove relations between our privacy
notions in Section 10 and show that the presented rela-
tions (depicted in Figure 6) are complete. Before that,
we argue our choice of notions in Section 6.
3 Our Game model
Our goal in formalizing the notions as a game is to
analyze a given ACN protocol w.r.t. to a notion, i.e.
the game is a tool to investigate if an adversary can
distinguish two self-chosen, notion-compliant scenarios.
Scenarios are sequences of communications. A commu-
nication is described by its sender, receiver, message
and auxiliary information (e.g. session identifiers) or the
empty communication, signaling that nobody wants to
communicate at this point. Some protocols might re-
strict the information flow to the adversary to only
happen at specific points in the execution of the pro-
tocol, e.g. because a component of the ACN processes
a batch of communications before it outputs statistics
about them. Therefore, we introduce batches as a se-
quence of communications, which is processed as a unit
before the adversary observes anything3. When this is
not needed, batches can always be replaced with single
communications.
As explained in Section 2, we do not need to de-
fine a complete new game for every privacy goal, since
notions only vary in the difference between the alter-
native scenarios chosen by the adversary. Hence, for a
given ACN and notion, our general game is simply in-
stantiated with a model of the ACN, which we call the
protocol model, and the notion. The protocol model ac-
cepts a sequence of communications as input. Similar
to the real implementations the outputs of the proto-
col model are the observations the real adversary can
make. Note, the adversaries in the game and the real
world have the same capabilities4, but differ in their
aims: while the real world adversary aims to find out
something about the users of the system, the game ad-
versary merely aims to distinguish the two scenarios she
has constructed herself.
In the simplest version of the game, the adversary
constructs two scenarios, which are just two batches of
communications and sends them to the challenger. The
challenger checks that the batches are compliant with
the notion. If so, the challenger tosses a fair coin to
randomly decide which of the two batches it executes
with the protocol model. The protocol model’s output
is returned to the game adversary. Based on this infor-
mation, the game adversary makes a guess about the
outcome of the coin toss.
We extend this simple version of the game, to allow
the game adversary to send multiple times two batches
to the challenger. However, the challenger performs a
single coin flip and sticks to this scenario for this game,
i.e. it always selects the batches corresponding to the
initial coin flip. This allows analyzing for adversaries,
that are able to base their next actions in the attack on
the observations they made previously.
3 We use the word batch to designate a bunch of communica-
tions. Besides this similarity, it is not related to batch mixes.
4 A stronger game adversary also implies that the protocol is
safer in the real world.
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Further, we allow for user (a sender or receiver) cor-
ruption, i.e. the adversary learns the user’s momentary
internal state, by sending corrupt queries to the chal-
lenger. Note that although the adversary decides on all
the communications that happen in the alternative sce-
narios, she does not learn secret keys or randomness
unless the user is corrupted. This allows to add several
options for different corruption models to the privacy
goals.
To model all possible attacks, we allow the adver-
sary to send protocol queries. This is only a theoretical
formalization to reflect what information the adversary
gets and what influence she can exercise. These proto-
col query messages are sent to the protocol model with-
out any changes by the challenger. The protocol model
covers the adversary to ensure that everything the real
world adversary can do is possible in the game with
some query message. For example, protocol query mes-
sages can be used to add or remove nodes from the ACN
by sending the appropriate message.
As introduced in Section 2, we say that an adversary
has an advantage in winning the game, if she guesses
the challenger-selected scenario correctly with a higher
probability than random guessing. A protocol achieves
a certain privacy goal, if an adversary has at most neg-
ligible advantages in winning the game.
Formalization
In this subsection, we formalize the game model to con-
form to the above explanation.
We use Π to denote the analyzed ACN protocol
model, Ch for the challenger and A for the adversary,
which is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. Ad-
ditionally, we use X as a placeholder for the specific
notion, e.g. sender unobservability, if we explain or de-
fine something for all the notions. A communication
r in Π is represented by a tuple (u, u′,m, aux) with
a sender u, a receiver u′, a message m, and auxiliary
information aux (e.g. session identifiers). Further, we
use ♦ instead of the communication tuple (u, u′,m, aux)
to represent that no communication occurs. Commu-
nications are clustered into batches rb = (rb1 , . . . , rbl),
with rbi being the i-th communication of batch rb. Note
that we use r (underlined) to identify batches and r
(no underline) for single communications. Batches in
turn are clustered into scenarios; the first scenario is
(r01 , . . . , r0k). A challenge is defined as the tuple of
two scenarios
(
(r01 , . . . , r0k), (r11 , . . . , r1k)
)
. All symbols
used so far and those introduced later are summarized
in Tables 12 – 14 in Appendix C.
Simple Game.
1. Ch randomly picks challenge bit b.
2. A sends a batch query, containing r0 and r1, to Ch.
3. Ch checks if the query is valid, i.e. both batches
differ only in information that is supposed to be
protected according to the analyzed notion X.
4. If the query is valid, Ch inputs the batch corre-
sponding to b to Π.
5. Π’s output Π(rb) is handed to A.
6. After processing the information, A outputs her
guess g for b.
Extensions. As explained above, there are useful ex-
tensions we make to the simple game:
Multiple Batches Steps 2-5 can be repeated.
User corruption Instead of Step 2, A can also decide
to issue a corrupt query specifying a user u and re-
ceive u’s internal state as output. This might change
Π’s state, lead to different behavior of Π in follow-
ing queries and yield a higher advantage in guessing
than before.
Other parts of the adversary model Instead of
Step 2, A can also decide to issue a protocol query,
containing an input specific to Π and receive Π’s
output to it (e.g. the internal state of a router that
is corrupted in this moment). This might change
Π’s state.
Achieving notion X. Intuitively, a protocol Π
achieves a notion X if any possible adversary has
at most negligible advantage in winning the game.
To formalize the informal understanding of Π achiev-
ing goal X, we need the following denotation.
Pr[g = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π, X, c, b)〉] describes the probability
that A (with at most c challenge rows, i.e. communi-
cations differing in the scenarios) outputs g, when Ch
is instantiated with Π and X and the challenge bit was
chosen to be b. With this probability, achieving a notion
translates to Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Achieving a notion X). An ACN Proto-
col Π achieves X, iff for all probabilistic polynomial
time(PPT) algorithms A there exists a negligible δ such
that∣∣ Pr[0 = 〈A | Ch(Π, X, c, 0)〉]−Pr[0 = 〈A | Ch(Π, X, c, 1)〉] ∣∣≤ δ.
We use a variable δ, which is referred to as negligible, as
an abbreviation when we actually mean a function δ(κ)
that is negligible in a security parameter κ.
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Equivalence to Other Definitions
Notice, that this definition is equivalent to
(1) Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π, X, c, 0)〉] ≤
Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π, X, c, 1)〉] + δ.
and
(2) Pr[1 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π, X, c, 1)〉] ≤
Pr[1 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π, X, c, 0)〉] + δ.
(1): |Pr[0 | 0]− Pr[0 | 1]| ≤ δ for all A ⇐⇒ (Pr[0 |
0]−Pr[0 | 1] ≤ δ for all A) ∧ (Pr[0 | 1]−Pr[0 | 0] ≤ δ for
all A). To every attack A with Pr[0 | 1]− Pr[0 | 0] > δ,
we can construct A′ with Pr[0 | 0] − Pr[0 | 1] > δ.
Since the definition requires the inequality to hold for
all attacks, this is enough to prove that (1) implies the
original, the other way is trivial. This is how we con-
struct it: Given attack A, we construct A′ by chang-
ing the batches of the first with the second scenario.
Hence, Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π, X, c, 0)〉] = Pr[0 = 〈A′ ∣∣
Ch(Π, X, c, 1)〉] and Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π, X, c, 1)〉] =
Pr[0 = 〈A′
∣∣ Ch(Π, X, c, 0)〉].
(2): To every attack A breaking (1), we can con-
struct one with the same probabilities in (2). Given at-
tacker A, we construct A′ as the one that changes the
batches of the first with the second scenario and inverts
the output of A. Hence, Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π, X, c, 0)〉] =
Pr[1 = 〈A′
∣∣ Ch(Π, X, c, 1)〉] and Pr[1 = 〈A ∣∣
Ch(Π, X, c, 0)〉] = Pr[0 = 〈A′
∣∣ Ch(Π, X, c, 1)〉]. Since
we can reverse this operations by applying them again,
we can also translate in the other direction.
Differential Privacy based Definition
For some use cases, e.g. if the court of your jurisdiction
requires that the sender of a critical content can be iden-
tified with a minimal probability of a certain threshold
e.g. 70%, a non-negligible δ might be sufficient. Hence,
we allow to specify the parameter of δ and extend it
with the allowed number of challenge rows c to finally
include the well-known concept of differential privacy as
AnoA does in the following definition:
Definition 2 (Achieving (c, , δ)−X). An ACN proto-
col Π is (c, , δ)−X with c > 0,  ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, iff
for all PPT algorithms A:
Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π, X, c, 0)〉] ≤
ePr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π, X, c, 1)〉] + δ.
Notice that  describes how close the probabilities of
guessing right and wrong have to be. This can be inter-
preted as the quality of privacy for this notion. While
δ describes the probability with which the -quality can
be violated. Hence, every ACN protocol will achieve
(0, 1) − X for any notion X, but this result does not
guarantee anything, since with probability δ = 1 the
-quality is not met.
The first variant can be expressed in terms of the
second as Π achieves X, iff Π is (c, 0, δ)−X for a negli-
gible δ and any c ≥ 0.
4 Protected Properties
We define properties to specify which information about
the communication is allowed to be disclosed to the ad-
versary, and which must be protected to achieve a pri-
vacy notion, as mentioned in Section 2. We distinguish
between simple and complex properties. Simple proper-
ties can be defined with the basic game model already
introduced, while complex properties require some ex-
tensions to the basic model.
4.1 Simple Properties
We summarize the informal meaning of all simple prop-
erties in Table 1 and introduce them in this section.
Assume an ACN aims to hide the sender but dis-
closes message lengths to observers. For this case, we
specify the property (|M |) that the message length must
not differ between the two scenarios, as this information
must not help the adversary to distinguish which sce-
nario the challenger chose to play.
Next, we might want an ACN to protect the identity
of a sender, as well as any information about who sent
a message, but deliberately disclose which messages are
received by which receiver, who the receivers are, and
potentially other auxiliary information. We hence spec-
ify a property (ES) where only the senders differ be-
tween the two scenarios5, to ensure that the adversary
in our game can only win by identifying senders. In case
the protection of the receiver identities or messages is
required, the same can be defined for receivers (ER) or
messages (EM ).
Further, we might want the ACN to protect senders
and also the messages; leaving the receiver and auxil-
iary information to be disclosed to the adversary. This
is achieved by specifying a property where only senders
and messages differ between the two scenarios and ev-
5 E symbolizes that only this property may vary in the two
submitted scenarios and everything else remains equal.
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Symbol Description Translation to Game
|M | Message Length Messages in the two scenarios always
have the same length.
ES Everything but Senders Everything except the senders is iden-
tical in both scenarios.
ER/EM Everything but Re-
ceivers/Messages
Analogous
ESM Everything but Senders and
Messages
Everything except the senders and
messages is identical in both scenar-
ios.
ERM/ESR Analogous Analogous
♦6 Something is sent In every communication something
must be sent (♦ not allowed).
ℵ Nothing Nothing will be checked; always true.
U/U ′ Active Senders/Receivers Who sends/receives is equal for both
scenarios.
Q/Q′ Sender/Receiver Frequen-
cies
Which sender/receiver sends/receives
how often is equal for both scenarios.
|U |/|U ′| Number of Senders/ Re-
ceivers
How many senders/receivers commu-
nicate is equal for both scenarios.
P/P ′ Message Partitioning per
Sender/Receiver
Which messages are sent/received
from the same sender/receiver is
equal for both scenarios.
H/H′ Sender/Receiver Fre-
quency Histograms
How many senders/receivers
send/receive how often is equal
for both scenarios.
Table 1. Simple properties; information about communications
that may be required to remain private
erything else remains equal (ESM ). Again, the same can
be specified for receivers and messages (ERM ) or senders
and receivers (ESR).
Lastly, ACNs might allow the adversary to learn
whether a real message is sent or even how many mes-
sages are sent. We specify a property (♦6 ) that requires
real communications in both scenarios, i.e. it never hap-
pens that nothing is sent in one scenario but something
is sent in the other. We ensure this by not allowing the
empty communication ().
However, a very ambitious privacy goal might even
require that the adversary learns no information about
the communication at all (ℵ). In this case, we allow any
two scenarios and check nothing.
Formalizing those Simple Properties. In the
following definition all simple properties mentioned so
far are formally defined. Therefore, we use > as symbol
for the statement that is always true.
Definition 3 (Properties |M |, ES , ESM , ♦6 , ℵ). Let
the checked batches be r0, r1, which include the
communications r0j ∈ {(u0j , u′0j ,m0j , aux0j ), } and
r1j ∈ {(u1j , u′1j ,m1j , aux1j ), } with j ∈ {1, . . . l}.
We say the following properties are met, iff for all
j ∈ {1, . . . l}:
|M | : |m0j | = |m1j |
ES : r1j = (u1j , u′0j ,m0j , aux0j )
ER : r1j = (u0j ,u′1j ,m0j , aux0j )
EM : r1j = (u0j , u′0j ,m1j , aux0j )
ESM : r1j = (u1j , u′0j ,m1j , aux0j )
ERM : r1j = (u0j ,u′1j ,m1j , aux0j )
ESR : r1j = (u1j ,u′1j ,m0j , aux0j )
♦6 : ♦ 6∈ r0 ∧ ♦ 6∈ r1
ℵ : >
More Simple Properties: Active Users, Frequen-
cies. The properties of Definition 3 are important to
formalize privacy, but are by themselves not sufficient.
Take the ACN Tor as an example: While the set of ac-
tive senders is trivially known to their ISPs and the
guard nodes, we still require that the senders are un-
linkable with the messages they are sending (and their
receivers). Similarly, the sending (receiving) frequency
of a party may be important and is not formalized yet.
To formalize these properties, we use sets that capture
which user sent which messages in a certain period, i.e.
a batch of communications (and similarly sets to cap-
ture which user received which messages). Note that we
use primes (′) for the corresponding sets and properties
of the receivers.
Definition 4 (Sender-Message Linking). We define
the sender-message linkings for scenario b (L′bi the
receiver-message linkings are analogous) as:
Lbi :={(u, {m1, ...,mh})
∣∣ u sent messages m1, . . . ,mh
in batch i}.
The sets from Definition 4 allow easy identification of
who an active sender in this batch was and how often
each sent something:
Definition 5 (Active Sender Set, Frequency Set). Let
the current batch be the k-th one. For b ∈ {0, 1} Ub, Qb
(U ′b, Q′b for L′b) are defined as:
Ub := {u
∣∣ (u,M) ∈ Lbk}
Qb := {(u, n)
∣∣ (u,M) ∈ Lbk ∧ |M | = n}
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Recall that we currently define properties for ACNs that
allow the adversary to learn which senders are active at
different times, or the number of messages they send
during some periods, while hiding some other proper-
ties (e.g. which messages they have sent). Hence, with
the respective sets for active users and user frequencies
defined, we need only to request that they are equal in
both scenarios:
Definition 6 (Properties U , Q, |U |). We say that the
properties U,Q, |U | (U ′, Q′, |U ′| analogous) are met, iff:
U : U0 = U1 Q : Q0 = Q1 |U | : |U0| = |U1|
More Simple Properties: Message Partitions,
Histograms. Other interesting properties are which
messages came from a given sender and how many
senders sent how many messages. If the adversary knows
which messages are sent from the same sender, e.g. be-
cause of a pseudonym, she might be able to combine
information from them all to identify the sender. If she
knows how many senders sent how many messages, she
knows the sender activity and hence can make conclu-
sions about the nature of the senders.
As before, we introduce auxiliary variables to for-
mally define these two properties. We use Mb,I to de-
note the collection of messages that has been sent by
the same sender (e.g. linked by a shared pseudonym) in
a set of batches, and Mb,I,n to denote the union of all
these sets of cardinality n. The equality of the properties
in the two scenarios must pertain throughout all com-
parable batches in the scenarios. If this were not true,
the inequality would help the adversary to distinguish
the scenarios without learning the protected informa-
tion e.g. identifying the sender.
Definition 7 (Multi-Batch-Message Linkings). Let the
current batch be the k-th, K := {1, . . . , k}, P(K) the
power set of K and U the set of all possible senders
(U ′ receivers). For b ∈ {0, 1} and I ∈ P(K): We define
(M ′b,I ,M ′b,I,n for L′bi)
– the multi-batch-message-sender linking:
Mb,I := ∪u∈U{∪i∈I{M |(u,M) ∈ Lbi}} and
– the cardinality restricted multi-batch-message-
sender linking: Mb,I,n := {M ∈Mb,I
∣∣ |M | = n}.
As before, we define auxiliary variables capturing the
information that we want to be equal in both scenarios:
We define ordered sets specifying which messages are
sent from the same user for any set of batches (Message
Partition Pb) and how many users sent how many mes-
sages for any set of batches (Histogram Hb). Therefore,
we use a slightly unusual notation: For any set Z, we
use (Zi)i∈{1,...,k} to denote the sequence (Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk)
and −→P (Z) to denote a sorted sequence of the elements
of the power set6 of Z.
Definition 8 (Message partitions, Histograms). Con-
sider the k-th batch, K := {1, . . . , k}. For b ∈ {0, 1}
Pb, Hb (P ′b, H ′b analogous) are defined as:
Pb := (Mb,I)I∈−→P (K)
Hb := ({(n, i)
∣∣ i = |Mb,I,n|})I∈−→P (K)
Further, we say that properties P,H (P ′, H ′ analo-
gous) are met, iff:
P : P0 = P1 H : H0 = H1
4.2 Complex Properties
So far, we have defined various properties to protect
senders, messages, receivers, their activity, frequency
and the grouping of messages. However, this is not suf-
ficient to formalize several relevant privacy goals, and
we must hence introduce complex properties.
Learning Sender and Receiver. Consider that
one aims to hide which sender is communicating with
which receiver. Early ACNs like classical Mix-Nets [8],
and also Tor [10], already used this goal. Therefore, we
want the adversary to win the game only if she identifies
both: sender and receiver of the same communication.
An intuitive solution may be to model this goal by
allowing the adversary to pick different senders and re-
ceivers (ESR) in both scenarios (see Fig. 2 (a) for an ex-
ample). This, however, does not actually model the pri-
vacy goal: by identifying only the sender or only the re-
ceiver of the communication, the game adversary could
tell which scenario was chosen by the challenger. We
hence must extend the simple properties and introduce
scenario instances to model dependencies.
Scenario instances. We now require the adver-
sary to give alternative instances for both scenarios (Fig.
2 (b)). The challenger chooses the scenario according to
the challenge bit, which is picked randomly for every
game, and the instance according to the instance bit,
which is picked randomly for every challenge.
Formally, we replace steps 2–5 of the game with the
following steps:
6 For brevity we use ∈ to iterate through a sequence.
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2. A sends a batch query, containing r00, r10, r01and r11
to Ch.
3. Ch checks if the query is valid according to the an-
alyzed notion X.
4. If the query is valid and Ch has not already picked an
instance bit a for this challenge, Ch picks a ∈ {0, 1}
randomly and independent of b. Then it inputs the
batch corresponding to b and a to Π.
5. Π’s output Π(rab ) is forwarded to A.
This allows us to model the goal that the adversary is
not allowed to learn the sender and receiver: We allow
the adversary to pick two sender-receiver pairs, which
she uses as instances for the first scenario. The mixed
sender-receiver pairs must then be provided as instances
for the second scenario (see Fig. 2 (b)). We thus force
the game adversary to provide alternative assignments
for each scenario. This way she cannot abuse the model
to win the game by identifying only the sender or the
receiver. We call this property Random Sender Receiver
RSR.
This complex property is still not sufficient to model
the situation in, for example, Tor: The adversary can
distinguish the scenarios without learning who sent to
whom, just by learning which senders and which re-
ceivers are active. Hence, we further restrict the adver-
sary picking instances where both senders and both re-
ceivers are active by defining the property Mix Sender
Receiver MSR. Here, the adversary picks two instances
for b = 0 where her chosen sender-receiver pairs com-
municate, and two for b = 1 where the mixed sender-
receiver pairs communicate. The two instances simply
swap the order in which the pairs communicate (Fig.
2 (c)). This way, we force the adversary to provide al-
ternative assignments for each scenario where both sus-
pected senders and both suspected receivers are active.
This combination prevents the adversary from winning
the game without learning the information that the real
system is actually supposed to protect, i.e. the sender-
receiver pair.
A      B C      D
a)
A      B A      D
C      D C      B
A      B A      D
C      D C      B
scenario 0 scenario 1 b)
A      B A      D
C      D C      B
instance
0
instance
 1
scenario 0 scenario 1 c)
instance
0
instance
 1
scenario 0 scenario 1
Fig. 2. Examples showing the general structure of communica-
tions that differ in both scenarios: a) Naive, but incorrect b) Ran-
dom Sender Receiver RSR c) Mixed Sender Receiver MSR
Defining Complex Properties. To simplify the
formal definition of complex properties, we introduce
challenge rows. A challenge row is a pair of communica-
tions with the same index that differ in the two scenarios
(e.g. r0j , r1j with index j). For complex properties, the
challenger only checks the differences of the challenge
rows in the two scenarios.
Definition 9 (Properties RSR, MSR). Let the given
batches be rab for instances a ∈ {0, 1} and scenarios
b ∈ {0, 1}, CR the set of challenge row indexes, (ua0 , u′ a0 )
for both instances a ∈ {0, 1} be the sender-receiver-pairs
of the first challenge row of the first scenario (b = 0)in
this challenge . Random Sender Receiver RSR, Mixed
Sender Receiver MSR (RSM , RRM ,MSM ,MRM analo-
gous) are met, iff:
RSR : ra0 cr = (ua0,u′
a
0 ,m
1
0cr , aux
1
0cr ) ∧
ra1 cr = (ua0,u′
1−a
0 ,m
1
0cr , aux
1
0cr )
∀cr ∈ CR, a ∈ {0, 1}
MSR : ra0 cr = (ua0,u′
a
0 ,m
1
0cr , aux
1
0cr ) ∧
ra0 cr+1 = (u
1−a
0 ,u′
1−a
0 ,m
1
0cr , aux
1
0cr ) ∧
ra1 cr = (ua0,u′
1−a
0 ,m
1
0cr , aux
1
0cr ) ∧
ra1 cr+1 = (u
1−a
0 ,u′
a
0 ,m
1
0cr , aux
1
0cr )
for every second cr ∈ CR, a ∈ {0, 1}
Linking message senders. A final common privacy
goal that still cannot be covered is the unlinkability of
senders over a pair of messages (Twice Sender Unlink-
ability). Assume a real world adversary that can deter-
mine that the sender of two messages is the same entity.
If subsequently she discovers the identity of the sender
of one of the messages through a side channel, she can
also link the second message to the same individual.
Stages. To model this goal, we need two scenar-
ios (1) both messages are sent by the same sender, and
(2) each message is sent by a different sender. Further,
the adversary picks the messages for which she wants
to decide whether they are sent from the same individ-
ual, and which other messages are sent between those
two messages. Therefore, we add the concept of stages
and ensure that only one sender sends in the challenge
rows of stage 1, and in stage 2 either the same sender
continues sending (b = 0) or another sender sends those
messages (b = 1). This behavior is specified as the prop-
erty Twice Sender TS .
Definition 10 (Property TS). Let the given batches be
rab for instances a ∈ {0, 1} and scenarios b ∈ {0, 1}, x
the current stage, CR the set of challenge row indexes,
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(ua0 , u′
a
0) for both instances a ∈ {0, 1} be the sender-
receiver-pairs of the first challenge row of the first sce-
nario (b = 0) in this challenge in stage 1 and (u˜a0 , u˜′a0 )
the same pairs in stage 2. Twice Sender TS is met, iff
(TR analogous):
TS : x = stage1 ∧
ra0 cr = (ua0, u′
0
0 ,m
1
0cr , aux
1
0cr ) ∧
ra1 cr = (ua0, u′
0
0 ,m
1
0cr , aux
1
0cr )
∨ x = stage2 ∧
ra0 cr = (ua0, u˜′ 00 ,m10cr , aux
1
0cr ) ∧
ra1 cr = (u
1−a
0 , u˜
′ 0
0 ,m
1
0cr , aux
1
0cr )
∀cr ∈ CR, a ∈ {0, 1}
Hence, we need to facilitate distinct stages for notions
with the complex properties TS or TR. Precisely, in step
2 of the game, the adversary is additionally allowed to
switch the stages.
Note that the above definition can easily be ex-
tended to having more stages and hence, more than
two messages for which the adversary needs to decide
whether they have originated at the same sender.
This set of properties allows us to specify all pri-
vacy goals that have been suggested in literature as pri-
vacy notions and additionally all that we consider im-
portant. It is of course difficult to claim completeness,
as future ACNs may define diverging privacy goals and
novel observable properties (or side-channels) may be
discovered.
5 Privacy Notions
Given the properties above, we can now set out to ex-
press intuitive privacy goals as formal privacy notions.
We start by specifying sender unobservability as an ex-
ample leading to a general definition of our privacy no-
tions.
Recall the first game we defined in Section 2, which
corresponds to sender unobservability (SO = S(ender)
¬ O(bservability)). There, in both scenarios something
has to be sent, i.e. we need to specify that sending noth-
ing is not allowed: ♦6 . Further, both scenarios can only
differ in the senders, i.e. we also need the property that
everything but the senders is equal: ES . Hence, we de-
fine sender unobservability as SO :=♦6 ∧ES . 7
We define all other notions in the same way:
Definition 11 (Notions). Privacy notions are defined
as a boolean expression of the properties according to
Table 6.
Notion Properties
(SR)L ♦6 ∧ESR ∧MSR
(SR)O ♦6 ∧ESR ∧RSR
MO ♦6 ∧EM
MO − |M | ♦6 ∧EM ∧ |M |
MO[ML] ♦6 ∧Q ∧Q′
O ♦6
CO ℵ
SO ♦6 ∧ES
SO − |U | ♦6 ∧ES ∧ |U |
SO −H ♦6 ∧ES ∧H
SO − P ♦6 ∧ES ∧ P
SFL ♦6 ∧ES ∧ U
SFL−H ♦6 ∧ES ∧ U ∧H
SFL− P ♦6 ∧ES ∧ U ∧ P
SML ♦6 ∧ES ∧Q
SML− P ♦6 ∧ES ∧Q ∧ P
(2S)L ♦6 ∧ES ∧ TS
RO etc. analogous
SO[MO] ♦6 ∧ESM
SO[MO − |M |] ♦6 ∧ESM ∧ |M |
(SM)O ♦6 ∧ESM ∧RSM
(SM)L ♦6 ∧ESM ∧MSM
RO[MO − |M |] etc. analogous
SO{X′} Properties of X′, remove ER
for X′ ∈ {RO, RO − |U ′|, RO −H′, RO − P ′, RFL,
RFL−H′, RFL− P ′, RML, RML− P ′}
RO{X} analogous
Table 2. Definition of the notions. A description of simple proper-
ties was given in Table 1.
Modeling the notions as a game, the respective chal-
lenger verifies all properties (and the later introduced
options) of the adversary’s queries. A complete descrip-
tion of the challenger can be found in Appendix A. Fur-
ther, an example of how the definitions can be repre-
sented by using a challenge specific state, which the
challenger maintains, is shown in Algorithms 1 and 2
in Appendix B.
7 Technically ES already includes ♦6 . However, to make the dif-
ferences to other notions more clear, we decide to mention both
in the definition.
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6 On the Choice of Notions
The space of possible combinations of properties, and
hence of conceivable privacy notions, is naturally large.
Due to this, we verify our selection of privacy goals by
finding exemple use cases. Additionally, we demonstrate
the choice and the applicability of our definition by an-
alyzing the privacy goals of Loopix, an ACN that was
recently published. We additionally verify that our pri-
vacy notions include those of previous publications that
suggest frameworks based on indistinguishability games,
and provide a complete mapping in Section 9.
6.1 Example Use Cases for the Notions
We illustrate our notions by continuing the example of
an activist group trying to communicate in a repressive
regime, although our notions are generally applicable.
Recall the general idea of an indistinguishability
game from the examples in Section 2: To prove that
an ACN hides certain properties, whatever is allowed to
be learned in the actual ACN must not help a game ad-
versary to win. This way, she is forced to win the game
solely based on those properties that are required to re-
main hidden. Therefore, the information allowed to be
disclosed cannot be used in the game and hence must
be kept identical in both scenarios.
Before giving examples, we need to order the no-
tions. We chose to group them semantically. Our re-
sulting clusters are shown as gray boxes in Figure 6.
Horizontally, we categorize notions that focus on re-
ceiver or sender protection (Receiver Privacy Notions
or Sender Privacy Notions, respectively) or treat both
with the same level of importance (Impartial Notions).
Inside those categories, we use clusters concerning the
general leakage type: Both-side Unobservability means
that neither senders, nor receivers or messages should
be leaked. Both-side Message Unlinkability means that
it should be possible to link neither senders nor receivers
to messages. In Sender Observability, the sender of every
communication can be known, but not the message she
sends or to whom she sends (Receiver and Message Ob-
servability analogous). In Sender-Message Linkability,
who sends which message can be known to the adver-
sary (Receiver-Message and Sender-Receiver Linkability
analogous).
We also want to explain our naming scheme, which
we summarize in Table 3. Our notions consider three
dimensions: senders, messages and receivers. Each no-
Usage Explanation
D ∈ {S,R,M} Dimension ∈ {Sender, Receiver, Message}
Dimension D not mentioned Dimension can leak
Dimension D mentioned Protection focused on this dimension exists
DO not even the participating items regarding D
leak,(e.g. SO: not even U leaks)
DFL participating items regarding D can leak, but
not which exists how often (e.g. SFL: U leaks,
but not Q)
DML participating items regarding D and how often
they exist can leak ( e.g. SML: U,Q leaks)
X − Prop, like X but additionally Prop can leak
Prop ∈ {|U |,H, P, |U ′|,H′, P ′, |M |}
(D1D2)O uses RD1D2 ; participating items regarding
D1, D2 do not leak, (e.g. (SR)O: RSR)
(D1D2)L uses MD1D2 ; participating items regarding
D1, D2 can leak, (e.g. (SR)L: MSR)
(2D)L uses TD; it can leak whether two participating
item regarding D are the same, (e.g. (2S)L:
TS)
O short for SOROMO
MO[ML] short for MO(SML,RML)
SO{X} short for SOMOX
D1X1[D2X2] D1 is dominating dimension, usually D1 has
more freedom, i.e. X2 is a weaker restriction
than X1
CO nothing can leak (not even the existence of any
communication)
Table 3. Naming Scheme
tion restricts the amount of leakage on each of those
dimensions. However, only dimensions that are to be
protected are part of the notion name. We use O, short
for unobservability, whenever the set of such existing
items of this dimension cannot be leaked to the adver-
sary. E.g. SO cannot be achieved if the set of senders
U is leaked. Notions carrying L, short for unlinkability,
can leak U (for sender related notions), but not some
other property related to the item. E.g. we use SFL if
the frequency Q cannot be leaked and SML, if Q can
be leaked, but not the sender-message relation. With a
“−Prop” we signal that the property Prop can addition-
ally leak to the adversary. We distinguish those prop-
erties from U and Q used before as they give another
leakage dimension (as illustrated later in the hierarchy).
Further, we use parentheses as in (SR)O to symbolize
that if not only one set, but both sets of senders and
receivers (U and U ′) are learned the notion is broken.
Analogously, in (SR)L both sets can be learned but the
linking between sender and receiver cannot. For the last
missing complex property, we use (2S)L to symbolize
that two senders have to be linked to be the same iden-
tity to break this notion.
For readability we add some abbreviations: We use
O = SOROMO to symbolize unobservability on all
three types and we summarize the remaining types in
MO(SML,RML) to MO[ML]. CO symbolizes the no-
tion in which nothing is allowed to leak. Further, we
use curly brackets to symbolize that the message can-
not be leaked SO{X} = SOMOX and we put the (in
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our understanding) non dominating part of the notion
in brackets SOMO = SO[MO].
6.1.1 Impartial Privacy Notions
These notions treat senders and receivers equally.
Message Observability. The content of messages
can be learned in notions of this group, as messages are
not considered confidential. Because the real world ad-
versary can learn the content, we must prevent her from
winning the game trivially by choosing different content.
Hence, such notions use the property that the scenarios
are identical except for the senders and receivers (ESR)
to ensure that the messages are equal in both scenarios.
Example: An activist of the group is already well-
known and communication with that person leads to per-
secution of Alice.
Alice needs a protocol that hides whether a certain
sender and receiver communicate with each other; cf.
Section 4.2 motivation of the complex property MSR.
The resulting notion is Sender-Receiver Pair Unlinka-
bility ((SR)L).
Example (cont.): Only few people participate in
the protocol. Then, just using the protocol to receive
(send) something, when the well known activist is acting
as sender (receiver) threatens persecution.
Alice needs a protocol that hides whether a certain
sender and receiver actively participate at the same time
or not; cf. Section 4.2 motivation of the complex prop-
erty RSR. The resulting notion is Sender-Receiver Un-
observability ((SR)O).
Sender-Receiver Linkability (Message Confi-
dentiality). Senders and receivers can be learned in
notions of this group, because they are not considered
private. Hence, such notions include the property that
the scenarios are identical, except for the messages (EM )
to ensure that the sender-receiver pairs are equal in both
scenarios.
Example: Alice wants to announce her next demon-
stration. (1) Alice does not want the regime to learn the
content of her message and block this event. (2) Further,
she is afraid that the length of her messages could put
her under suspicion, e.g. because activists tend to send
messages of a characteristic length.
In (1) Alice needs a protocol that hides the con-
tent of the messages. However, the adversary is allowed
to learn all other attributes, in particular the length of
the message. Modeling this situation, the scenarios may
differ solely in the message content; all other attributes
must be identical in both scenarios, as they may not
help the adversary distinguish between them. Beyond
the above-described EM , we must thus also request that
the length of the messages |M | is identical in both sce-
narios. The resulting notion is Message Unobservability
leaking Message Length (MO − |M |)8.
In the second case (2), the protocol is required to
hide the length of the message. The length of the mes-
sages thus may differ in the two scenarios, as the pro-
tocol will need to hide this attribute. Hence, we remove
the restriction that the message length |M | has to be
equal in both scenarios from the above notion and end
up with Message Unobservability MO.
Both-Side Message Unlinkability. Notions of
this group are broken if the sender-message or receiver-
message relation is revealed.
Example: The activists know that their sending and
receiving frequencies are similar to regime supporters’
and that using an ACN is in general not forbidden, but
nothing else. Even if the content and length of the mes-
sage (MO) and the sender-receiver relationship ((SR)L)
is hidden, the regime might be able to distinguish un-
critical from critical communications, e.g. whether two
activists communicate “Today” or innocent users an in-
nocent message. In this case, the regime might learn that
currently many critical communications take place and
improves its measures against the activists.
In this case, the activists want a protocol that hides
the communications, i.e. relations of sender, message
and receiver. However, as using the protocol is not for-
bidden and their sending frequencies are ordinary, the
adversary can learn which users are active senders or
receivers and how often they sent and receive. Modeling
this, the users need to have the same sending and re-
ceiving frequencies in both scenarios Q,Q′, since it can
be learned. However, everything else needs to be pro-
tected and hence, can be chosen by the adversary. This
corresponds to the notion Message Unobservability with
Message Unlinkability (MO[ML]).
Both-Side Unobservability. Even the activity
of a certain sender or receiver is hidden in notions of
this group.
Example (cont.): It is a risk for the activists, if
the regime can distinguish between two leading activists
exchanging the message “today” and two loyal regime
supporters exchanging the message “tomorrow”.
In this case, Alice wants to disclose nothing about
senders, receivers, messages or their combination. How-
ever, the adversary can learn the total number of com-
8 We stick to our naming scheme here, although we would com-
monly call this confidentiality.
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munications happening in the ACN. Modeling this, we
need to assure that for every communication in the first
scenario, there exists one in the second. We achieve this
by prohibiting the use of the empty communication with
property ♦6 . This results in the notion Unobservability
(O).
Example: The regime knows that a demonstration
is close, if the total number of communications trans-
mitted over this protocol increases. It then prepares to
block the upcoming event.
To circumvent this, Alice needs a protocol that ad-
ditionally hides the total number of communications.
Modeling this, we need to allow the adversary to pick
any two scenarios. Particularly, use of the empty com-
munication ♦ is allowed. This is represented in the prop-
erty that nothing needs to be equal in the two scenarios,
ℵ , and results in the notion Communication Unobserv-
ability (CO). Note that this is the only notion where
the existence of a communication is hidden. All other
notions include ♦6 and hence do not allow for the use of
the empty communication.
6.1.2 Sender (and Receiver) Privacy Notions
These notions allow a greater freedom in picking the
senders (or receivers: analogous notions are defined for
receivers.).
Receiver-Message Linkability. The receiver-
message relation can be disclosed in notions of this
group. Hence, such notions include the property that
the scenarios are identical except for the senders (ES) to
ensure the receiver-message relations are equal in both
scenarios.
In Sender-Message Unlinkability (SML) the total
number of communications and how often each user
sends can be additionally learned. However, who sends
which message is hidden. In Sender-Frequency Unlink-
ability (SFL) the set of users and the total number of
communications can be additionally disclosed. However,
how often a certain user sends is hidden, since it can
vary between the two scenarios. In Sender Unobserv-
ability (SO), the total number of communications can
additionally be disclosed. However, especially the set of
active senders Ub is hidden.
If a notion further includes the following abbrevia-
tions, the following information can be disclosed as well:
– with User Number Leak (−|U |): the number of
senders that send something in the scenario
– with Histogram Leak (−H): the histogram of how
many senders send how often
– with Pseudonym Leak (−P ): which messages are
sent from the same user
Example: Alice is only persecuted when the regime can
link a message with compromising content to her – she
needs a protocol that at least provides SML−P . How-
ever, since such a protocol does not hide the message
content, the combination of all the messages she sent
might lead to her identification. Opting for a protocol
that additionally hides the message combination (P ),
i.e. provides SML, can protect her from this threat.
Further, assuming most users send compromising con-
tent, and Alice’s message volume is high, the regime
might easily suspect her to be the origin of some compro-
mising messages even if she is careful that the combina-
tion of her messages does not reidentify her – she needs
a protocol that does not disclose her sending frequen-
cies (Q) although the combination of her messages (P )
might be learned, i.e. achieving SFL−P . However, Alice
might fear disclosing the combination of her messages -
then she needs a protocol achieving at least SFL −H,
which hides the frequencies (Q) and the message com-
bination (P ), but discloses the sending histogram, i.e.
how many people sent how many messages (H). How-
ever, if multiple activist groups use the ACN actively at
different time periods, disclosing the sending histogram
H might identify how many activist groups exist and to
which events they respond by more active communica-
tion – to prevent this she needs a protocol that hides the
frequencies Q and the histogram H, i.e. provides SFL.
Further, not only sending a certain content, but also be-
ing an active sender (i.e. being in U) is prosecuted she
might want to pick a protocol with at least SO − P .
Again if she is afraid that leaking P or H together with
the expected external knowledge of the regime would
lead to her identification, she picks the corresponding
stronger notion. If the regime knows that senders in the
ACN are activists and learns that the number of active
senders is high, it blocks the ACN. In this case at least
SO should be picked to hide the number of senders (|U |).
Example: For the next protest, Alice sends two
messages: (1) a location, and (2) a time. If the regime
learns that both messages are from the same sender,
they will block the place at this time even if they do not
know who sent the messages. Alice then needs a protocol
that hides whether two communications have the same
sender or not. We already explained how to model this
with complex property TS in Section 4.2. The resulting
notion is Twice Sender Unlinkability((2S)L).
Receiver Observability. In notions of this group
the receiver of each communication can be learned.
Hence, such notions include the property that the sce-
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narios are equal except for the senders and messages
(ESM ) to ensure that they are equal in both scenarios.
Example: Consider not only sending real messages
is persecuted, but also the message content or any com-
bination of senders and message contents is exploited by
the regime. If the regime e.g. can distinguish activist Al-
ice sending “today” from regime supporter Charlie send-
ing “see u”, it might have learned an information the
activists would rather keep from the regime. Further, ei-
ther (1) the activists know that many messages of a cer-
tain length are sent or (2) they are not sure that many
messages of a certain length are sent.
In case (1), Alice needs a ACN, that hides the sender
activity, the message content and their combination.
However, the adversary can especially learn the message
length. Modeling this, beyond the above described ESM ,
the message lengths have to be equal |M |. This results
in the notion Sender Unobservability with Message Un-
observability leaking Message Length (SO[MO − |M |]).
Note that in SO[MO−|M |] the properties of MO−|M |
are included and further the senders are allowed to dif-
fer in the two scenarios. The second case (2) requires
a protocol that additionally hides the message length.
Hence, in modeling it we remove the property that the
message lengths are equal |M | from the above notion.
This results in Sender Unobservability with Message Un-
observability (SO[MO]).
Example: Alice’s demonstration is only at risk if
the regime can link a message with a certain content to
her as a sender with a non negligible probability. Then
at least Sender-Message Pair Unlinkability ((SM)L),
which is defined analogous to (SR)L is needed.
Example (cont.): However, (SM)L only allows
Alice to claim that not she, but Charlie sent a criti-
cal message ma and the regime cannot know or guess
better. Now assume that Dave is also communicating,
then the regime might be able to distinguish Alice send-
ing ma, Charlie mc and Dave md from Alice sending
md, Charlie ma and Dave mc. In this case, it might
not even matter that Alice can claim that Charlie possi-
bly sent her message. The fact that when comparing all
three communications that possibly happened, Alice is
more likely to have sent the critical message ma means
a risk for her.
To circumvent this problem Alice needs a protocol
that not only hides the difference between single pairs of
users, but any number of users. Modeling this, instead of
the complex propertyMSM , we need to restrict that the
active senders’ sending frequencies are equal, i.e. SML.
Example: In another situation our activists already
are prosecuted for being a sender while a message with
critical content is sent.
In this case at least Sender-Message Pair Unobserv-
ability ((SM)O), which is defined analogous to (SR)O
is needed.
Analogous notions are defined for receivers.
Sender Privacy Notions: Both-Side Message
Unlinkability. As explained with the example before
in the case that Alice does not want any information
about senders, receivers and messages or their com-
bination to leak, she would use O. However, the pri-
vacy in this example can be tuned down, if she assumes
that the regime does not have certain external knowl-
edge or that the users are accordingly careful. As ex-
plained for the Sender Notions with Receiver-Message
Linkability before, in this case we might decide to allow
U ′, |U ′|, Q′, H ′, P ′ to leak.
If a notion X ∈ {RO,RO − |U ′|, RO − H ′, RO −
P ′, RFL,RFL−H ′, RFL−P ′, RML,RML−P ′} is ex-
tended to Sender Unobservability by X (SO{X}), the
leaking of the sender-message relation is removed. This
is done by removing ER. Since the attacker now has a
greater degree of freedom in choosing the senders and
is (if at all) only restricted in how she chooses the re-
ceivers and messages, this is a special strong kind of
Sender Unobservability. Analogous notions are defined
for receivers.9
6.2 Analyzing Loopix’s Privacy Goals
To check if we include currently-used privacy goals, we
decide on a current ACN that has defined its goals
based on an existing analytical framework and which
has already been analyzed: the Loopix anonymity sys-
tem [15]. In this section, we show that the privacy goals
of Loopix map to notions we have defined (although the
naming differs). Loopix aims for Sender-Receiver Third-
Party Unlinkability, Sender online Unobservability and
Receiver Unobservability.
Sender-Receiver Third-Party Unlinkability.
Sender-Receiver Third-Party Unlinkability means that
an adversary cannot distinguish scenarios where two re-
ceivers are switched:
“The senders and receivers should be unlinkable by any
unauthorized party. Thus, we consider an adversary that
wants to infer whether two users are communicating. We
define sender-receiver third party unlinkability as the inabil-
9 Note that SO{RO} = RO{SO} = O.
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Notion Name Aspects
LSO Loopix’s Sender Unobservavility E♦
LRO Loopix’s Receiver Unobservability E♦
SO
′ Restricted Sender Unobservability 6→ ∧ES
RO
′ Restricted Receiver Unobservability 6→ ′ ∧ ER
Table 4. Definition of the Loopix notions
ity of the adversary to distinguish whether {S1 → R1, S2 →
R2} or {S1 → R2, S2 → R1} for any concurrently online
honest senders S1, S2 and honest receivers R1, R2 of the
adversary’s choice.” [15]
The definition in Loopix allows the two scenarios to be
distinguished by learning the first receiver. We interpret
the notion such that it is only broken if the adversary
learns a sender-receiver-pair, which we assume is what is
meant in [15]. This means that the sender and receiver of
a communication must be learned and is exactly the goal
that motivated our introduction of complex properties:
(SR)L.
Unobservability. In sender online unobservability
the adversary cannot distinguish whether an adversary-
chosen sender communicates ({S →}) or not ({S 6→}):
“Whether or not senders are communicating should be hid-
den from an unauthorized third party. We define sender
online unobservability as the inability of an adversary to
decide whether a specific sender S is communicating with
any receiver {S →} or not {S 6→}, for any concurrently
online honest sender S of the adversary’s choice.” [15]
Receiver unobservability is defined analogously.
Those definitions are open to interpretation. On the
one hand, {S 6→} can mean that there is no correspond-
ing communication in the other scenario. This corre-
sponds to our ♦ and the definition of LSO and LRO
according to Table 4. When a sender is not sending in
one of the two scenarios, this means that there will be a
receiver receiving in the other, but not in this scenario.
Hence, LSO can be broken by learning about receivers
and the two notions are equal. These notions are equiv-
alent to CO:
Theorem 1. It holds that
(c, , δ)− CO ⇒ (c, , δ)− LSOCR1 .
(c, , δ)− CO ⇐ (2c, , δ)− LSOCR1 .
Proof sketch. CO =⇒ LSO by definition. For
LSO =⇒ CO we use the following argumentation:
Given an attack on CO, we can construct an attack
on LSO with the same success. Assume a protocol has
LSO, but not CO. Because it does not achieve CO, there
exists a successful attack on CO. However, this implies
that there exists a successful attack on LSO (we even
know how to construct it). This contradicts that the
protocol has LSO. We construct an successful attack
on LSO by creating two new batches (r0,♦) and (♦, r1)
for every challenge row (r0, r1) in the successful attack
on CO.
On the other hand, {S 6→} can mean that sender u
does not send anything in this challenge. In this case,
the receivers can experience the same behavior in both
scenarios and the notions differ. We formulate these no-
tions as SO′ and RO′ according to Table 4. Therefore,
we need a new property that some sender/receiver is
not participating in any communication in the second
scenario:
Definition 12 (Property 6→). Let u be the sender of
the first scenario in the first challenge row of this chal-
lenge. We say that 6→ is fulfilled iff for all j : u1j 6= u.
(Property 6→ ′ is defined analogously for receivers.)
Theorem 2. It holds that
(c, , δ)− SO ⇒ (c, , δ)− SO′ and
(c, 0, 2δ)− SO ⇐ (c, 0, δ)− SO′.
Proof sketch. Analogously to Theorem 1. ⇒: Every at-
tack on SO′ is by definition a valid attack on SO.
⇐: Given an attack A on (c, 0, 2δ)−SO, where both
scenarios of a challenge use all users (otherwise it would
be a valid attack on SO′). Let (r21 , . . . , r2l) be the same
batch as the second ofA except that whenever one of the
two senders of the first challenge row from the original
scenarios is used, it is replaced with an arbitrary other
sender (that was not used in the first challenge row of
the original scenarios). Let P (0|2) be the probability
that A outputs 0, when the new batches are run; P (0|0)
when the first scenario of A is run and P (0|1) when the
second is run. In the worst case for the attacker P (0|2) =
P (0|0)+P (0|1)
2 (otherwise we would replace the scenario
b where |P (0|2) − P (0|b)| is minimal with the new one
and get better parameters in the following calculation).
Since A is an attack on (c, 0, 2δ)−SO, P (0|0) > P (0|1)+
2δ. Transposing and inserting the worst case for P (0|2)
leads to: P (0|0) > 2P (0|2)− P (0|0) + 2δ ⇐⇒ P (0|0) >
P (0|2) + δ. Hence, using A with the adapted scenario is
an attack on (c, 0, δ)− SO′10.
10 An analogous argumentation works for (c,  − ln(0.5), δ) −
SO ⇐ (c, , δ)− SO′.
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This is equivalent to AnoA’s sender anonymity αSA.
Analogously, Loopix’s corresponding receiver notion is
equivalent to RO, which is even weaker than AnoA’s
receiver anonymity.
Remark. We do not claim that the Loopix system
achieves or does not achieve any of these notions, since
we based our analysis on the definitions of their goals,
which were not sufficient to unambiguously derive the
corresponding notions.
7 Options for Notions
Additionally to the properties, we define options. Op-
tions can be added to any notion and allow for a more
precise mapping of real world protocols, aspects of the
adversary model, or easier analysis by quantification.
7.1 Protocol-dependent: Sessions
Some ACN protocols, like e.g. Tor, use sessions. Sessions
encapsulate sequences of communications from the same
sender to the same receiver by using the same session
identifier for them. In reality, the adversary might be
able to observe the session identifiers but (in most cases)
not to link them to a specific user.
To model sessions, we therefore set the auxiliary in-
formation of a communication to the session ID (sess):
aux = sess. However, as the adversary can choose this
auxiliary information, we need to ensure that the sce-
narios cannot be distinguished just because the session
identifier is observed. Hence, we definine sess to be a
number in most communications. Only for the session
notions, we require special session IDs that correspond
to the current challenge Ψ and stage x in all challenge
rows: (x,ChΨ). In this way, they have to be the same in
both scenarios and a concrete sess is only used in one
stage of one challenge.
The session identifier that is handed to the ACN
protocol model is a random number that is generated
by the challenger when a new sess is seen. Hence, nei-
ther leaking (it is a random number) nor linking session
identifiers (it will be picked new and statistically in-
dependent for every challenge and stage) will give the
attacker an advantage.
We formalize this in the following definition, where
we also use ‘_’ to declare that this part of a tuple can
be any value.11
11 E.g. ∃(u,m,_) ∈ r will be true iff ∃u′ : ∃(u,m, u′) ∈ r.
Symbol Description
X Adaptive corruption is allowed.
Xc− Only static corruption of users is allowed.
Xc0 No corruption of users is allowed.
X Corrupted users not restricted.
Xcsr Corrupted users are not allowed to be chosen as senders
or receivers.
Xcs Corrupted users are not allowed to be senders.
Xcr Corrupted users are not allowed to be receivers.
Xce Corrupted users send/receive identical messages in
both scenarios.
Table 5. Options for corruption and for corrupted communication
Definition 13 (Sessions). Let x be the stage and
ua0 , u
a
1 , u
′a
0 , u
′a
1 be the senders and receivers of the first
challenge row of this challenge Ψ and stage in instance
a ∈ {0, 1}. Property sess is met, iff for all a ∈ {0, 1}:
sess : ∀(ra0 , ra1 ) ∈ CR(ra0 , ra1) : (ra0 , ra1 ) =
(ua0 , u′a0 ,_, (x,ChΨ)), (ua1 , u′a1 ,_, (x,ChΨ))
As not all protocols use sessions, we allow to add ses-
sions as an option to the notion X abbreviated by Xs.
7.2 Adversary Model: Corruption
Some adversary capabilities like user corruption imply
additional checks our challenger has to do. As all prop-
erties are independent from corruption, we add corrup-
tion as an option, that can be more or less restricted as
shown in Table 5. The different corruption options have
implications on the challenger, when a corrupt query or
a batch query arrives.
Check on corrupt queries. This check depends
on whether the user corruption is adaptive, static, or not
allowed at all. The default case for notion X is adaptive
corruption, i.e. the adversary can corrupt honest users
at any time. With static corruption Xc− , the adversary
has to corrupt a set of users before she sends her first
batch. The third option, Xc0 , is that no user corruption
is allowed. We denote the set of corrupted users as Uˆ .
Definition 14 (Corruption: Check on Corrupt Query).
Let Uˆ be the set of already corrupted users, u the user
in the corrupt query and the bit subsequent be true iff at
least one batch query happened. The following properties
are met, iff:
corrstatic : subsequent =⇒ u ∈ Uˆ
corrno :⊥ corradaptive : >
Check on batch queries. In reality for most ACNs
the privacy goal can be broken for corrupted users, e.g.
a corrupted sender has no unobservability. Therefore,
we need to assure that the adversary cannot distin-
guish the scenario because the behavior of corrupted
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users differs. This is done by assuring equal behav-
ior corrce or banning such users from communicating
corrcsr , corrcs , corrcr .
Definition 15 (Corruption: Check on Batch Query).
The following properties are met, iff for all a ∈ {0, 1}:
corrcsr : ∀(u, u′,m, aux) ∈ ra0 ∪ ra1 : u 6∈ Uˆ ∧ u′ 6∈ Uˆ
corrcs : ∀(u, u′,m, aux) ∈ ra0 ∪ ra1 : u 6∈ Uˆ
corrcr : ∀(u, u′,m, aux) ∈ ra0 ∪ ra1 : u′ 6∈ Uˆ
corrce : ∀uˆ ∈ Uˆ : ra0i = (uˆ,_,m,_) =⇒ ra1i = (uˆ,_,m,_)
∧ ra0i = (_, uˆ,m,_) =⇒ ra1i = (_, uˆ,m,_)
Of course user corruption is not the only important part
of an adversary model. Other adversarial capabilities
can be adjusted with other parts of our framework (like
the corruption of other parts of the ACN with protocol
queries).
7.3 Easier Analysis: Quantification
For an easier analysis, we allow the quantification of
notions in the options. This way a reduced number of
challenge rows (challenge complexity) or of challenges
(challenge cardinality) can be required. The next section
includes information on how results with low challenge
cardinality imply results for higher challenge cardinali-
ties.
Challenge Complexity. Example: Consider Al-
ice using a protocol, that achieves SO for one challenge
row (SOCR1), but not for two (SOCR2). This means in
the case that Alice only communicates once, the adver-
sary is not able to distinguish Alice from any other po-
tential sender Charlie. However, if Alice communicates
twice the regime might distinguish her existence from the
existence of some other user, e.g. by using an intersec-
tion attack.
To quantify how different the scenarios can be, we
add the concept of challenge complexity. Challenge com-
plexity is measured in Challenge rows, the pairs of com-
munications that differ in the two scenarios as defined
earlier. c is the maximal allowed number of challenge
rows in the game. Additionally, we add the maximal al-
lowed numbers of challenge rows per challenge #cr as
option to a notion X with XCR#cr .
Definition 16 (Challenge Complexity). Let #CR be
the number of challenge rows in this challenge so far,
We say that the following property is met, iff:
CR#cr :#CR ≤ #cr
Notion including option Definition
Xs Properties of X ∧ sess
Xce , Xcsr etc. ∧corrce , ∧corrcsr etc.
XCR#cr Properties of X ∧ CR#cr
Table 6. Definition of notions including the options; for all no-
tions X
Challenges Cardinality. So far, our definitions fo-
cused on one challenge. We now bound the number of
challenges to n, as the adversary potentially gains more
information the more challenges are played. While chal-
lenge complexity defines a bound on the total number
of differing rows within a single challenge, cardinality
bounds the total number of challenges. Communications
belonging to a challenge are identified by the challenge
number Ψ, which has to be between 1 and n to be valid.
The challenge number is a part of the auxiliary infor-
mation of the communication and is only used by the
challenger, not by the protocol model.
This dimension of quantification can be useful for
analysis, since for certain assumptions the privacy of
the n-challenge-case can be bounded in the privacy of
the single-challenge-case as we will discuss in the next
section.
8 Capturing Different Adversaries
The adversary model assumed in the protocol model can
be further restricted by adding adversary classes, that
filter the information from the adversary to the chal-
lenger and vice versa. Potentially many such adversary
classes can be defined.
Adversary Classes. AnoA introduces adversary
classes, i.e. a PPT algorithm that can modify and fil-
ter all in- and outputs from/to the adversary. Adver-
sary classes C can be included into our framework in
exactly the same way: to wrap the adversary A. In-
stead of sending the queries to Ch, A sends the queries
to C, which can modify and filter them before send-
ing them to Ch. Similarly, the answers from Ch are
sent to C and possibly modified and filtered before sent
further to A. Adversary classes that fulfill reliability,
alpha-renaming and simulatability (see [3] for defini-
tions) are called single-challenge reducible. For such ad-
versary classes it holds that every protocol Π that is
(c, , δ)-X for C(A), is also (n ·c, n · , n · nδ)-X for C(A).
Even though our framework extends AnoA’s in multi-
ple ways, the proof for multi-challenge generalization
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of AnoA is independent from those extensions and still
applies to our framework.
Proof sketch. The proof is analogous to the one in Ap-
pendix A.1 of [3]12: we only argue that our added
concepts (adaptive corruption, arbitrary sessions and
grouping of challenge and input queries to batches) do
not change the indistinguishability of the introduced
games.
Adaptive Corruption In Games G0 till G2, G3 till
G6 and G9 to G10 communications that reach the pro-
tocol model are identical. Hence, also adaptive corrup-
tion queries between the batch queries will return the
same results (if adaptive corruption is used probabilis-
tic: the probability distribution for the results is equal
in all these games). G2 to G3 and G7 to G8 by induction
hypothesis. G6 to G7 and G8 to G9 adaptive corruption
is independent from the used challenge numbers (called
challenge tags in [3]).
The argumentation for sessions and batches in anal-
ogous. Notice that by using the batch concept, in some
games a part of the communications of a batch might
be simulated, while another part is not.
Note that since the adversary class C is only a PPT
algorithm, C(A) still is a PPT algorithm and hence, a
possible adversary against X when analyzed without an
adversary class. So, while adversary classes can help to
restrict the capabilities of the adversary, results shown
in the case without an adversary class carry over.
Using UC-Realizability. AnoA shows that, if a
protocol Π UC-realizes an ideal functionality F , which
achieves (c, , δ)−X, Π also achieves (c, , δ+ δ′)-X for a
negligible δ′. As the proof is based on the (, δ)- differ-
ential privacy definition of achieving a notion and inde-
pendent from our extensions to the AnoA framework,
this result still holds.
Proof sketch. AnoA’s proof assumes that Π does not
achieve (, δ + δ′)-X. Hence, there must be an attack
A distinguishing the scenarios. With this, they build a
PPT distinguisher D that uses A to distinguish Π from
F . Since, even with our extensions A still is a PPT al-
gorithm, that can be used to build distinguisher D and
the inequalities that have to be true are the same (since
the definition of achieving (, δ)-X is the same as being
(, δ)-differentially private. The combination of Π not
12 Note, although they include the challenge number n in the
definition of achieving a notion, this is not used in the theorem.
being (, δ + δ′)-X and F being (, δ)−X results in the
same contradiction as in AnoA’s proof.
9 Relations to Prior Work
In this Section, we introduce existing frameworks and
point out to which of our notions their notions corre-
sponds. We argue that our framework includes all their
assumptions and notions relevant for ACNs and thus
provides a combined basis for an analysis of ACNs. For
each framework, we first quickly give an idea why the
properties and options match the notions of it and fo-
cus on how the concepts (like batches) relate later on.
The resulting mapping is shown in Table 7 and reasoned
below.
Framework Notion Equivalent to
AnoA αSA SOcec−sCR1
αRA RO[MO − |M |]cec−sCR1
αREL (SR)Ocec−sCR2
αUL (2S)Lcec−sCR2
αsSA SOcec−s
αsRA RO[MO − |M |]cec−s
αsREL
13 (SR)Ocec−s
αsUL
14 (2S)Lcec−s
Bohli’s S/SA = R/SA O
R/SUP SO{RO − |U ′|}
R/WUP SO{RO −H′}
R/PS SO{RO − P ′}
R/SUU SO{RFL}
R/WUU SO{RFL−H′}
R/AN SO{RFL− P ′}
R/WU SO{RML}
R/WA SO{RML− P ′}
S/SA◦ SO
S/SUP ◦ SO − |U |
S/WUP ◦ SO −H
S/PS◦ SO − P
S/SUU◦ SFL
S/WUU◦ SFL−H
S/AN◦ SFL− P
S/WU◦ SML
S/WA◦ SML− P
S/X,R/X◦ analogous
X+ 〈X〉ce
X∗ 〈X◦〉ce
Hevia’s UO COc0 , k = 1
SRA Oc0 , k = 1
SA∗ SO{RML}c0 , k = 1
SA SOc0 , k = 1
UL MO[ML]c0 , k = 1
SUL SMLc0 , k = 1
RA∗, RUL,RA analogous
Gelernter’s RH,τSA R
H,τ
SA c0 ⇐⇒ SO − P c0 , k = 1
R
H,τ
SUL R
H,τ
SL c0
⇐⇒ SML− P c0 , k = 1
RX analogous Hevia: 〈X〉
RHX analogous Hevia: 〈X〉csr
RˆHX analogous Hevia 〈X〉cs
Table 7. Equivalences, 〈X〉 equivalence of X used
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AnoA Framework
AnoA [3] builds its privacy notions on (, δ) differential
privacy and compares them to their interpretation of
the terminology paper of Pfitzmann and Hansen [14].
AnoA’s αSA allows only one sender to change, the
same is achieved with the combination of ES and CR1.
In AnoA’s αRA also the messages can differ, but have to
have the same length, which we account for with using
ERM and |M |. AnoA’s αREL will either end in one of the
given sender-receiver combinations been chosen (b = 0)
or one of the mixed cases (b = 1). This is exact the
same result as RSR generates. For AnoA’s αUL either
the same sender is used in both stages or each of the
senders is used in one of the stages. This behavior is
achieved by our property TS . Although AnoA checks
that the message length of the communication of both
scenarios is equal, only the first message is used in any
possible return result of αUL. Hence, not checking the
length and requiring the messages to be the same as we
do in TS is neither weaker nor stronger.
Our model differs from AnoA’s model in the batch
queries, the adaptive corruption, the arbitrary sessions
and the use of notions instead of anonymity functions.
Instead of batch queries AnoA distinguishes between in-
put, i.e. communications that are equal for both sce-
narios, and challenge queries, i.e. challenge rows. Input
queries are always valid in AnoA. They are also valid
in our model, because all the privacy aspects used for
our notions equivalent to AnoA’s hold true for identical
batches without ♦ and ♦ is not allowed in the equivalent
notions. In AnoA’s single-message anonymity functions
only a limited number of challenge queries, i.e. challenge
rows, is allowed per challenge. We ensure this restriction
with CR#cr. In AnoA, the adversary gets information
after every communication. This is equivalent to mul-
tiple batches of size one in our case. We assume that
for the analyzed protocol a protocol model can be cre-
ated, which reveals the same or less information when
it is invoked on a sequence of communications at once
instead of being invoked for every single communica-
tion. Our notions, which match the AnoA notions, al-
low for batches of size one. So, our batch concept neither
strengthens nor weakens the adversary.
13 Under the assumption that in all cases m0 is communicated
like in αREL of [3] and in αSREL of one older AnoA version [2].
14 Under the assumption that the receiver in stage 2 can be
another than in stage 1 like in αUL of [3].
AnoA’s corruption is static, does not protect cor-
rupted users15 and AnoA includes restrictions on ses-
sions. Hence, AnoA’s notions translate to ours with
the static corruption Xc− , the corrupted communica-
tion have to be equal in both scenarios Xce and the
session option of our model Xs.
AnoA’s challenger does not only check properties,
but modifies the batches with the anonymity functions.
However, the modification results in one of at most four
batches. We require those four batches (as combination
of scenario and instances) as input from the adversary,
because it is more intuitive that all possible scenarios
stem from the adversary. This neither increases nor re-
duces the information the adversary learns, since she
knows the challenger algorithm.
Bohli’s Framework
Bohli and Pashalidis [5] build a hierarchy of application-
independent privacy notions based on what they define
as “interesting properties”, that the adversary is or is
not allowed to learn. Additionally, they compare their
notions to Hevia’s, which we introduce next, and find
equivalences.
It is easy to see, that our definitions of U,Q,H
(P is not easy and hence, explained more detailed be-
low) match the ones of Bohli’s properties (who sent,
how often any sender sends and how many senders sent
how often) although we do not use a function that
links every output message with the sender(/receiver),
but the sender-messages-sets(/receiver-messages-sets).
Bohli and Pashalidis additionally define the restriction
of picking their communications equal except for the
user (depending on the current notion sender or re-
ceiver) ◦. This is the same as allowing only the senders
resp. receivers to differ (ES resp. ER).
Conceptually, our model differs from Bohli’s model
in the concept of challenges, the advantage definition,
the order of outputs, and the allowed behavior of cor-
rupted users.
Bohli’s notions can be understood as one challenge
(n = 1) with arbitrarily many challenge rows (any c).
Further, it does not use a multiplicative term in its ad-
vantage ( = 0). Then δ equals the advantage, which
has to be 0 to unconditionally provide a privacy notion
or negligible to computationally provide this notion.
15 Although AnoA does not explicitly state this, we understand
the analysis and notions of AnoA this way, as scenarios differing
in the messages corrupted users send/receive could be trivially
distinguished.
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Bohli’s framework assumes that the protocol out-
puts information as an information vector, where each
entry belongs exactly to one communication. The ad-
versary’s goal in Bohli’s framework is to link the index
number of the output vector with the sender or receiver
of the corresponding communication.
All except one of their properties can be determined
given the batches of both scenarios. However, the linking
relation property that partitions the index numbers of
the output vector by user (sender or receiver depend-
ing on the notion), can only be calculated once the
output order is known. Since our notions shall be in-
dependent from the analyzed protocol, the challenger
cannot know the protocol and the way the output order
is determined. Running the protocol on both scenarios
might falsely result in differing output orders for non-
deterministic protocols.
Thus, we adapt the linking relation for ACNs to
be computable based on the batches. The interesting
output elements the adversary tries to link in ACNs
are messages. Hence, here the linking relation parti-
tions the set of all messages into the sets of messages
sent/received by the same user, which can be calculated
based on the batches. This adaption is more restrictive
for an adversary, since the partition of output numbers
can be equal for both scenarios even though the sent
messages are not. However, if the adversary is able to
link the output number to the message, she can calcu-
late our new linking relations based on Bohli’s.
Further, Bohli’s framework allows for notions, where
the behavior of corrupted users differs in the two scenar-
ios. This means privacy of corrupted users is provided,
i.e. the adversary wins if she can observe the behavior
of corrupted users. Those notions are the ones without
the option Xce .
To match our batch query, Bohli’s input queries,
which include communications of both scenarios, have
to be combined with a nextBatch query, which signals
to hand all previous inputs to the protocol.
Hevia’s Framework
Hevia and Micciancio [13] define scenarios based on
message matrices. Those message matrices specify who
sends what message to whom. Notions restrict differ-
ent communication properties like the number or set
of sent/received messages per fixed user, or the num-
ber of total messages. Further, they construct a hier-
archy of their notions and give optimal ACN protocol
transformations that, when applied, lead from weaker
to stronger notions.
Mapping of the properties follows mainly from
Bohli’s and the equivalences between Bohli and Hevia
(including the one we correct in the following para-
graph). Besides this, only Hevia’s Unobservability (UO),
where the matrices can be picked arbitrary, is new. How-
ever, this corresponds to our ℵ property, that always
returns TRUE and allows any arbitrary scenarios.
Our model differs from Hevia’s, since ours considers
the order of communications, allows adaptive attacks
and corruption.
Our game allows to consider the order of communi-
cations. Analyzing protocol models that ignore the order
will lead to identical results. However, protocol models
that consider the order do not achieve a notion – al-
though they would in Hevia’s framework, if an attack
based on the order exists. 16
Most of Hevia’s notions are already shown to match
Bohli’s with only one batch (k = 1) and no corrup-
tion (Xc0) [5]. However, we have to correct two map-
pings: in [5] Hevia’s strong sender anonymity (SA∗),
which requires the number of messages a receiver re-
ceives to be the same in both scenarios was mistakenly
matched to Bohli’s sender weak unlinkability (S/WU+),
in which every sender sends the same number of mes-
sages in both scenarios. The needed restriction is real-
ized in Bohli’s R/WU+ instead. The proof is analogous
to Lemma 4.3 in [5]. The same reasoning leads to Bohli’s
sender weak unlinkability (S/WU+) as the mapping for
Hevia’s strong receiver anonymity (RA∗).
Gelernter’s Framework
Gelernter and Herzberg [11] extend Hevia’s framework
to include corrupted participants. Additionally, they
show that under this strong adversary an ACN proto-
col achieving the strongest notions exists. However, they
prove that any ACN protocol with this strength has to
be inefficient, i.e. the message overhead is at least linear
in the number of honest senders. Further, they introduce
relaxed privacy notions that can be efficiently achieved.
The notions of Gelernter’s framework build on
Hevia’s and add corruption, which is covered in our
corruption options. Only the relaxed notions RH,τSA and
RH,τSUL are not solely a corruption restriction. We define
new notions as RH,τSA =♦6 ∧G and RH,τSL = ♦6 ∧Q∧G that are
16 Creating an adapted version left a degree of freedom. Our
choice of adaptation corresponds with the interpretation of
Hevia’s framework that was used, but not made explicit in
Bohli’s framework.
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equivalent to some of the already introduced notions to
make the mapping to the Gelernter’s notions obvious.
They use a new property G, in which scenarios are only
allowed to differ in the sender names.
Definition 17 (Property G). Let U be the set of all
senders, sbi = {(u, {m1, . . . ,mh})
∣∣ u send message
m1, . . . ,mh in batch i} the sender-messages sets for sce-
nario b ∈ {0, 1}. We say that G is met, iff a permuta-
tion perm on U exists such that for all (u,M) ∈ s0k :
(perm(u),M) ∈ s1k .
Note that Gelernter’s relaxed notions (indistinguisha-
bility between permuted scenarios) is described by our
property G, the need for the existence of such a permu-
tation.
Theorem 3. It holds that
(c, , δ)−RH,τSA ⇐⇒ (c, , δ)− SO − P,
(c, , δ)−RH,τ
SL
⇐⇒ (c, , δ)− SML− P .
Proof sketch. Analogous to Theorem 1.
RH,τSA ⇒ SO − P : Every attack on SO − P is valid
against RH,τSA : Since P is fulfilled, for every sender u0 in
the first scenario, there exists a sender u˜0 in the second
scenario sending the same messages. Hence, the permu-
tation between senders of the first and second scenario
exists.
RH,τSA ⇐ SO − P : Every attack on RH,τSA is valid
against SO − P : Since there exists a permutation be-
tween the senders of the first and second scenario send-
ing the same messages, the partitions of messages sent
by the same sender are equal in both scenarios, i.e. P is
fulfilled.
RH,τ
SL
⇐⇒ SML−P : Q is required in both notions
by definition. Arguing that P resp. G is fulfilled given
the other attack is analogous to RH,τSA ⇐⇒ SO − P .
10 Hierarchy
Next, we want to compare all notions and establish their
hierarchy. To do this, for any pair of notions we ana-
lyze which one is stronger than, i.e. implies, the other.
This means, any ACN achieving the stronger notion also
achieves the weaker (implied) one. Our result is shown
in Figure 6, where all arrow types represent implica-
tions, and is proven as Theorem 4 below. Further, obvi-
ous implications between every notion SO{X}, RO{X}
and X exist, since SO{X} only adds more possibilities
to distinguish the scenarios. However, to avoid clutter
we do not show them in Figure 6. To ease understand-
ing the hierarchy for the first time, we added Appendix
D where it is plotted together with the most impor-
tant symbol tables. Further, the same hierarchy exists
between notions with the same session, corruption and
quantification options.
Further, we add a small hierarchy for the options
that holds by definition in Figure 4.
Theorem 4. The implications shown in Figure 6 hold.
Proof. Analogous to Theorem 1: We prove every impli-
cation X1 ⇒ X2 by an indirect proof of the following
outline: Given an attack on X2, we can construct an
attack on X1 with the same success. Assume a protocol
has X1, but not X2. Because it does not achieve X2,
there exists a successful attack on X2. However, this
implies that there exists a successful attack on X1 (we
even know how to construct it). This contradicts that
the protocol has X1.17 Due to this construction in the
proof the implications are transitive.
We use different arrow styles in Figure 6 to partition
the implications into those with analogous proofs.
The dashed, green implications hold, be-
cause of the following and analogous proofs:
Claim 1. (MO[ML] =⇒ SML) If protocol Π achieves
(c, , δ)−MO[ML], it achieves (c, , δ)− SML.
Proof. Given a valid attack A on SML. We show that
A is a valid attack on MO[ML]: Because of SML, Q is
fulfilled. Because of ES , the receivers of the communi-
cations input to the protocol are the same in both sce-
narios. Hence, every receiver receives the same number
of messages, i.e. Q′ is fulfilled. So, every attack against
(c, , δ)− SML is valid against (c, , δ)−MO[ML].
Now, assume a protocol Π that achieves (c, , δ) −
MO[ML], but not (c, , δ) − SML. Because it does not
achieve (c, , δ)− SML, there has to exist an successful
attack A on (c, , δ)− SML, i.e.
Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π, SML, c, 0)〉] >
e · Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π, SML, c, 1)〉] + δ.
We know A is also valid against (c, , δ) − MO[ML].
Thus, it exists a attack, with
Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π,MO[ML], c, 0)〉] >
e · Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π,MO[ML], c, 1)〉] + δ,
17 In AnoA, Bohli’s and Hevia’s framework some of these im-
plications are proved for their notions in the same way.
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Fig. 3. Our new hierarchy of privacy notions divided into sender, receiver and impartial notions and clustered by leakage type
Xce
X ⇐⇒ XCRc
Xcsr
Xcs Xcr Xc−
Xc0
Xs
Fig. 4. Additional implications for corruption and sessions
which contradicts the assumption that Π achieves
(c, , δ)−MO[ML].
The dotted, yellow implications hold, because
of the following and analogous proofs:
Claim 2. (SO{RML − P ′} =⇒ SO) If protocol Π
achieves (c, , δ)−SO{RML−P ′}, it achieves (c, , δ)−
SO.
Proof. Given a valid attack A on SO. We show that A is
a valid attack on SO{RML−P ′}: Because of ES of SO
the receiver-message pairs of the communications input
to the protocol are the same in both scenarios. Hence,
every receiver receives the same messages, i.e. Q′ and
P ′ are fulfilled. So, every attack against (c, , δ)− SO is
valid against (c, , δ)− SO{RML− P ′}.
Now, the proof by contradiction is done analogous
to the proof of Claim 1.
All dark blue implications (c, , δ) − X1 ⇒
(c, , δ) − X2 follow from the definition of the notions:
Every valid attack against X2 is valid against X1. This
holds because U ⇒ |U |, H ⇒ |U |, Q ⇒ U , P ⇒ H ,
Q⇒ H, ♦6 ⇒ ℵ and obviously for any properties A and
B: A ∧B ⇒ A resp. A ∧B ⇒ B.
The dotted, red implications (c, , δ)−X1 ⇒
(c, , δ)−X2 hold, because of the following and analogous
proofs:
Claim 3. (RO{SML} =⇒ RO[MO]) If protocol
Π achieves (c, , δ) − RO{SML}, it achieves (c, , δ) −
RO[MO].
Proof. Given attack A1 on (c, , δ)RO[MO]. We show
that A1 is valid against (c, , δ) − RO{SML}: Sending
nothing is not allowed in RO[MO] and hence, will not
happen (♦6 ) and because of ERM , every sender sends
equally often in both scenarios, i.e. Q is fulfilled.
Now, the proof by contradiction is done analogous
to the proof of Claim 1.
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The cyan implications (c, , δ) − X1 ⇒
(c, , 2δ)−X2 hold, because of the following and analo-
gous proofs 18:
Claim 4. (RO =⇒ (SR)O) If protocol Π achieves
(c, , δ)−RO, it achieves (c, , 2δ)− (SR)O.
Proof. We first argue the case of one challenge and later
on extend it to multiple challenges. Given attack A2 on
(1, , 2δ)− (SR)O. We construct two attacks A′1 and A′′1
against RO and show that one of those has at least the
desired success.
We construct attacks A′1 and A′′1 . We therefore pick
a′ = 0 and a′′ = 1. Those shall replace a, which would
be picked randomly by the challenger in (SR)O to de-
termine the batch instance. In A′1 we use the commu-
nications of A2 corresponding to a′ = 0 (for b = 0 and
b = 1) as challenge row, whenever a batch in A2 in-
cludes a challenge row. In A′′1 we analogously use the
communications corresponding to a′′ = 1.
We show that both A′1 and A′′1 are valid against
(1, , δ) − RO: Sending nothing is also not allowed in
(SR)O and hence, will not happen (♦6 ) and because of
the fixed a = a′ or a = a′′, the senders of challenge
rows are the same in both scenarios. Since also messages
are equal in (SR)O, the sender-message pairs are fixed
(ER). Hence, A′1 and A′′1 are valid against RO.
Since A2 is an successful attack on (1, , 2δ)−(SR)O
and A′1 and A′′1 against RO only fix the otherwise ran-
domly picked a:
0.5Pr[0 = 〈A′1
∣∣ Ch(Π, RO, c, 0)〉]+
0.5Pr[0 = 〈A′′1
∣∣ Ch(Π, RO, c, 0)〉]
>e · (0.5Pr[0 = 〈A′1
∣∣ Ch(Π, RO, c, 1)〉]+
0.5Pr[0 = 〈A′′1
∣∣ Ch(Π, RO, c, 1)〉]) + 2δ.
So,
0.5Pr[0 = 〈A′1
∣∣ Ch(Π, RO, c, 0)〉]
>e · (0.5Pr[0 = 〈A′1
∣∣ Ch(Π, RO, c, 1)〉] + δ
or
0.5Pr[0 = 〈A′′1
∣∣ Ch(Π, RO, c, 0)〉]
>e · (0.5Pr[0 = 〈A′′1
∣∣ Ch(Π, RO, c, 1)〉] + δ
18 For SO ⇒ (SR)O (resp. SO ⇒ (SM)O) pick challenge
rows differently; for b = 0 : a = a′ and for b = 1 : a = 1− a′ to
ensure that receivers (resp. messages) are equal.
For (2c, , δ) − SML ⇒ (c, , δ) − (SM)L,
(resp. RML⇒ (RM)L, SML− P ⇒ (SR)L) replace the
challenge row with the corresponding two rows.
must hold true (otherwise we get a contradiction with
the above inequality). Hence, A′1 or A′′1 has to success-
fully break (1, , δ)−RO.
In case of multiple challenges: the instance bit is
picked randomly for every challenge. Hence, we need to
construct one attack for every possible combination of
instance bit picks, i.e. 2c attacks in total19 from which
each is a PPT algorithm and at least one is at least as
successful as the attack on (c, , 2δ)− (SR)O.
Now, the proof by contradiction is done analogous
to the proof of Claim 1.
Remark. c can be any value in the proofs (esp. c = 1
or c > 1) the proposed constructions apply changes for
each challenge row.
Additionally, the corrupt queries are not changed
by the proposed constructions. Hence, the implications
hold true between those notions as long as they have the
same corruption options. Analogously sessions are not
modified by the constructions and the same implications
hold true between notions with equal session options.
Additional implications based on corruption and ses-
sions are shown in Figure 4. Most of them hold by defi-
nition. Only the equivalence with and without challenge
row restriction per challenge is not so easy to see and
proven below.
Theorem 5. For all X:
1. (c, , δ)−X ⇒ (c, , δ)−XCRc′ .
2. (c, , δ) − X ⇐ (c, , δ) − XCRc′ , if number of chal-
lenges not restricted.
Proof. 1. Trivial: Given an attack valid on X restricted
regarding the challenge rows per challenge. This attack
is also valid against X without challenge row restriction.
2. We need to construct a new attack:
Attack Construction 1. Given an attack A2, we con-
struct attack A1. Let n¯ be the number of previous chal-
lenges used in A1 so far. For every batch query bq with
n′′ challenge rows replace the challenge tag of the 1st
, . . . , c′st challenge row with n¯ + 1; continue with the
next c′ challenge rows and the increased challenge tag
until no challenge rows are left. Use all other queries as
19 Note that this does not contradict the PPT requirement of
our definition as only finding the right attack is theoretically
exponential in the number of challenges allowed. However, the
attack itself is still PPT (and might be even easier to find for a
concrete protocol).
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A2 does, give the answers to A2 and output whatever
A2 outputs.
Given attack A2 on X. We construct an attack A1 with
the same success against XCR1 by using Attack Con-
struction 1. We show that A1 is valid against XCR1 :
Attack Construction 1 assures, that at most c′ chal-
lenge rows are used in every challenge (CRc′), all other
aspects of X are fullfilled in A2, too. Since A1 perfectly
simulates the given attack A2, it has the same success.
Now, the proof by contradiction is done analogous
to the proof of Claim 1.
So far we have proven that implications between notions
exist. Further, we assure that the hierarchy is complete,
i.e. that there exist no more implications between the
notions of the hierarchy:
Theorem 6. For all notions X1 and X2 of our hier-
archy, where X1 =⇒ X2 is not proven or implied by
transitivity, there exists an ACN protocol achieving X1,
but not X2.
Proof. Overview. We construct the protocol in the
following way: Given a protocol Π that achieves X ′1 (X1
itself or a notion that implies X1), let protocol Π′ run Π
and additionally output some information I. We argue
that learning I does not lead to any advantage distin-
guishing the scenarios forX1. Hence, Π′ achievesX1. We
give an attack against X2 where learning I allows to dis-
tinguish the scenarios. Hence, Π′ does not achieve X2.
Further, we use the knowledge that =⇒ is transitive20
and give the systematic overview over all combinations
from sender or impartial notions to all other notions and
which proof applies for which relation in Table 8. Since
receiver notions are completely analogous to sender no-
tions, we spare this part of the table.
In Table 8 “⇒” indicates that the notion of the col-
umn implies the one of the row. “=” is used when the
notions are equal. Pn indicates that the counterexam-
ple is described in a proof with number n. PA and PB
are proofs covering multiple counterexamples and P ∗A is
a special one of those counterexamples. P ′n means the
proof analogous to Pn, but for the receiver notion. (Pn)
means that there cannot be an implication, because oth-
erwise it would be a contradiction with proof Pn since
our implications are transitive.
20 IfX1 =⇒ X2 andX1 6=⇒ X3, it follows thatX2 6=⇒ X3.
Numbered Proofs. The proofs identified in Table
8 follow.
Lemma 1. P4. (c, , δ) − SO{RO − |U ′|} 6=⇒
(c∗, ∗, δ∗) − (2R)L for any ∗ ≥ 0, δ∗ < 1, c∗ ≥ 2 and
any  ≥ 0, δ < 1, c ≥ 1.
Proof. Given a protocol Π, that achieves (c, , δ) −
SO{RO − |U ′|}. Let protocol Π′ be the protocol, that
behaves like Π and additionally publishes the current
number of receivers |U ′| after every batch. Since in
SO{RO− |U ′|} the number of receivers always needs to
be identical in both scenarios, outputting it will not lead
to new information for the adversary. So, Π′ achieves
(c, , δ)− SO{RO − |U ′|}.
Fix ∗ ≥ 0, δ∗ < 1, c∗ ≥ 2 arbitrarily. Let
u′0, u
′
1 be valid receivers and m0 a valid message.
(c∗, ∗, δ∗) − (2R)L of Π′ can be broken by the fol-
lowing attack: An adversary A inputs a batch query
with two valid challenge rows with differing receivers21:
((u′0,m0),SwitchStageQuery, (u′0,m0)) as instance 0 of
the first scenario, ((u′1,m0),SwitchStageQuery, (u′1,m0))
as instance 1 of the first scenario and
((u′0,m0),SwitchStageQuery, (u′1,m0)) as instance 0
and ((u′1,m0),SwitchStageQuery, (u′0,m0)) as instance
1 of the second scenario. If Π′ outputs the number
of receivers as being 1, both messages have been
received by the same user and A outputs 0. Oth-
erwise the number of receivers is 2 and the mes-
sages have been received by different users. It out-
puts 1 in this case and wins the game with cer-
tainty. Hence, Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π′, (2R)L, c∗, 0)〉] = 1
and Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π′, (2R)L, c∗, 1)〉] = 0 and thus
Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π′, (2R)L, c∗, 0)〉] > e∗ · Pr[0 = 〈A ∣∣
Ch(Π′, (2R)L, c∗, 1)〉] + δ∗ (since 1 > e∗ · 0 + δ∗).22
Tables 9 summarizes the ideas of proofs that work anal-
ogously to Lemma 1. I = (S,m) means the sender(S)-
message(m) pairs are published, i.e. it is leaked who
sent which message. 1.(S,m) means that the first sender-
message pair is revealed. |m| without brackets means
the set of all message lengths is published; |U| the
number of senders. The other abbreviations are used
analogously. The attack is shortened to the format
〈(communications of instance 0 scenario 0),(communi-
cations of instance 1 of scenario 0)〉,〈(communications
21 For a simplified representation we only present the parts of
the communication that differ in both scenarios and spare the
senders of the communications.
22 Notice, that any protocol would achieve (c∗, ∗, δ∗)− (2R)L
for c∗ = 1 since no complete challenge is possible there.
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CO O MO[ML] MO MO − |M | (SR)O (SR)L SO{RO − |U ′|} SO{RO −H′} SO{RO − P ′} SO{RFL} SO{RFL−H′} SO{RFL− P ′} SO{RML} SO{RML− P ′} SO[MO] SO[MO − |M |]
CO = ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒
O P1 = ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒
MO[ML] (P1) (P2) = ⇒ ⇒ P2 ⇒ (P2) (P2) (P2) (P2) (P2) (P2) (P2) (P2) (P2) (P2)
MO (P1) (P3) (P3) = ⇒ (P2) P3 (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3)
MO − |M | (P1) (P3) (P3) (P17) = (P2) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3)
(SR)O (P1) (P5) (P5) (P6) (P6) = P16 (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16)
(SR)L (P1) (P5) (P5) (P6) (P6) (P7) = (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P ′8) (P ′8)
SO{RO − |U ′|} (P1) (P4) ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ = ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒
SO{RO −H′} (P1) (P4) ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (PA) = ⇒ (PA) ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒
SO{RO − P ′} (P1) (P6) (P6) (P6) P6 ⇒ ⇒ (PA) (PA) = (PA) (PA) ⇒ (PA) ⇒ (P6) (P6)
SO{RFL} (P1) (P4) ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (PA) (PA) (PA) = ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒
SO{RFL−H′} (P1) (P4) ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) = ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒
SO{RFL− P ′} (P1) (P6) (P6) (P6) (P6) ⇒ ⇒ (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) = (PA) ⇒ (P6) (P6)
SO{RML} (P1) (P4) ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) = ⇒ ⇒ ⇒
SO{RML− P ′} (P1) (P6) (P6) (P6) (P6) ⇒ ⇒ (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) = (P6) (P6)
SO[MO] (P1) (P5) P5 ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) = ⇒
SO[MO − |M |] (P1) (P5) (P5) ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P17) =
SO (P1) (P5) (P5) (P6) (P6) ⇒ ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P6) (P6)
SO − |U | (P1) (P5) (P5) (P6) (P6) P7 ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (PB) (PB)
SO −H (P1) (P5) (P5) (P6) (P6) (P7) ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (PB) (PB)
SO − P (P1) (P5) (P5) (P6) (P6) (P7) ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (PB) (PB)
SFL (P1) (P5) (P5) (P6) (P6) (P7) ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (PB) (PB)
SFL−H (P1) (P5) (P5) (P6) (P6) (P7) ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (PB) (PB)
SFL− P (P1) (P5) (P5) (P6) (P6) (P7) ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (PB) (PB)
SML (P1) (P5) (P5) (P6) (P6) (P7) ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (PB) (PB)
SML− P (P1) (P5) (P5) (P6) (P6) (P7) ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (PB) (PB)
(2S)L (P1) (P5) (P5) (P6) (P6) P10 P11 (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11)
(SM)O (P1) (P5) (P5) (P6) (P6) P12 P13 (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13)
(SM)L (P1) (P5) (P5) (P6) (P6) P14 P15 (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15)
SO SO − |U | SO −H SO − P SFL SFL−H SFL− P SML SML− P (2S)L (SM)O (SM)L RO{SO − |U |} RO{SO −H} RO{SO − P} RO{SFL} RO{SFL−H}
CO ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒
O ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒
MO[ML] (P2) (P ′∗A ) (P ′∗A ) (P ′∗A ) (P ′∗A ) (P ′∗A ) (P ′∗A ) ⇒ ⇒ (P ′4) ⇒ ⇒ (P2) (P2) (P2) (P2) (P2)
MO (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P ′4) ⇒ ⇒ (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3)
MO − |M | (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P ′4) P ′17 P ′18 (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3)
(SR)O (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P ′4) (P ′17) P ′18) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16)
(SR)L (P ′8) (P ′8) (P ′8) (P ′8) (P ′8) (P ′8) (P ′8) (P ′8) (P ′8) (P ′4) (P19) (P20) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8)
SO{RO − |U ′|} ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA)
SO{RO −H′} ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA)
SO{RO − P ′} ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA)
SO{RFL} ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA)
SO{RFL−H′} ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA)
SO{RFL− P ′} ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA)
SO{RML} ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA)
SO{RML− P ′} ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA)
SO[MO] ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8)
SO[MO − |M |] ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8)
SO = ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8)
SO − |U | PB = ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (P ′4) P19 ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8)
SO −H (PB) PB = ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (P ′4) (P19) ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8)
SO − P (PB) PB PB = PB PB ⇒ PB ⇒ (P ′4) (P19) P20 (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8)
SFL (PB) PB PB PB = ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (P ′4) (P19) ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8)
SFL−H (PB) PB PB PB PB = ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (P ′4) (P19) ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8)
SFL− P (PB) PB PB PB PB PB = PB ⇒ (P ′4) (P19) (P20) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8)
SML (PB) PB PB PB PB PB PB = ⇒ (P ′4) (P19) ⇒ (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8)
SML− P (PB) PB PB PB PB PB PB PB = (P ′4) (P19) (P20) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8)
(2S)L (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) = P21 P22 (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11)
(SM)O (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P ′4) = P23 (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13)
(SM)L (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P ′4) (P19) = (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15)
RO{SFL− P} RO{SML} RO{SML− P} RO[MO] RO[MO − |M |] RO RO − |U ′| RO −H′ RO − P ′ RFL RFL−H′ RFL− P ′ RML RML− P ′ (2R)L (RM)O (RM)L
CO ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒
O ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒
MO[ML] (P2) (P2) (P2) (P2) (P2) (P2) (P ∗A) (P ∗A) (P ∗A) (P ∗A) (P ∗A) (P ∗A) ⇒ ⇒ (P4) ⇒ ⇒
MO (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P4) ⇒ ⇒
MO − |M | (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P3) (P4) (P17) (P18)
(SR)O (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P16) (P4) (P17) (P18)
(SR)L (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P4) (P17) (P18)
SO{RO − |U ′|} (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) PA ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ P4 ⇒ ⇒
SO{RO −H′} (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) PA PA ⇒ ⇒ PA ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (P4) ⇒ ⇒
SO{RO − P ′} (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) PA PA PA ⇒ PA PA ⇒ PA ⇒ (P4) P24 P9
SO{RFL} (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) PA PA PA PA ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (P4) ⇒ ⇒
SO{RFL−H′} (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) PA PA PA PA PA ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ (P4) ⇒ ⇒
SO{RFL− P ′} (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) PA PA PA PA PA PA ⇒ PA ⇒ (P4) (P24) (P9)
SO{RML} (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) PA PA PA PA PA PA P ∗A ⇒ ⇒ (P4) ⇒ ⇒
SO{RML− P ′} (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) PA PA PA PA PA PA PA PA ⇒ (P4) (P24) (P9)
SO[MO] (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) P8 (P4) ⇒ ⇒
SO[MO − |M |] (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P4) P17 P18
SO (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P4) (P17) (P18)
SO − |U | (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P4) (P17) (P18)
SO −H (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P4) (P17) (P18)
SO − P (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P4) (P17) (P18)
SFL (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P4) (P17) (P18)
SFL−H (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P4) (P17) (P18)
SFL− P (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P4) (P17) (P18)
SML (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P4) (P17) (P18)
SML− P (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P8) (P4) (P17) (P18)
(2S)L (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P11) (P4) (P17) (P18)
(SM)O (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P13) (P4) (P17) (P18)
(SM)L (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P15) (P4) (P17) (P18)
Table 8. Completeness; proofs for all relations between the notions
of instance 0 scenario 1),(communications of instance
1 of scenario 1)〉 (if both instances of the scenario are
equal, we shorten to:〈(communications of instance 0 sce-
nario 0)〉,〈(communications of instance 0 scenario 1)〉 )
and all not mentioned elements are equal in both sce-
narios. m0,m1,m2,m3 are messages with |m0| < |m1|,
|m2| = |m3| andm0 6= m1 6= m2 6= m3; u0, u1, u2 senders
and u′0, u′1, u′2 receivers.
Lemma 2. P10. (c, , δ) − (2S)L 6=⇒ (c∗, ∗, δ∗) −
(SR)L for any ∗ ≥ 0, δ∗ < 1, c∗ ≥ 2 and for any
 ≥ 0, δ < 1, c ≥ 2.
Proof. Given a protocol Π with (c, , δ) − CO. Let Π′
behave like Π and additionally publish the first sender-
receiver-pair. Since Π does not leak any information ex-
cept how many messages are sent in total, Π′ does not
leak any information except the first sender-receiver-
pair and how many messages are sent in total. Hence,
Π′ has (c, , δ) − (2S)L, because who sends the second
time is concealed (otherwise (c, , δ)−CO of Π could be
broken based on this, which would be a contradiction
to our assumption.).
Fix ∗ ≥ 0, δ∗ < 1, c∗ ≥ 2 and let u0, u1 be valid
senders and u′0, u′1 valid receivers. Then the following
attack on (c∗, ∗, δ∗)− (SR)L is possible: The adversary
A creates a batch query containing only challenge rows:
((u0, u′0), (u1, u′1)) as instance 0 of the first scenario,
((u1, u′1), (u0, u′0)) as instance 1 of the first scenario and
((u0, u′1), (u1, u′0)) as instance 0 of the second scenario,
((u1, u′0), (u0, u′1)) as instance 1 of the second scenario.
If the published first sender-receiver pair is u1, u′1 or
u0, u′0 , A outputs 0. Otherwise it outputs 1. Obviously,
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Pn X1 X2 I attack
P4 SO{RO − |U ′|} (2R)L |U ′| 〈((u′0,m0), switchStage, (u′0,m0)),
((u′1,m0), switchStage, (u′1,m0))〉,
〈((u′0,m0), switchStage, (u′1,m0)),
((u′1,m0), switchStage, (u′0,m0))〉
P6 SO{RO − P ′} MO − |M | m ((m2)), ((m3))
P24 SO{RO − P ′} (RM)O |U ′|,m 〈((u′0,m0), (u′0,m2)),
((u′0,m0), (u′1,m3))〉,
〈((u′0,m0), (u′0,m3)),
((u′0,m0), (u′1,m2))〉
P9 SO{RO − P ′} (RM)L P ′ 〈((u′0,m2), (u′0,m0), (u′1,m1)),
((u′0,m2), (u′1,m1), (u′0,m0))〉,
〈((u′0,m2), (u′0,m1), (u′1,m0)),
((u′0,m2), (u′1,m0), (u′0,m1))〉
P5 SO[MO] MO[ML] 1.R ((u′0), (u′1)), ((u′1), (u′0))
P8 SO[MO] RML− P ′ 1.R ((u′0), (u′1)), ((u′1), (u′0))
P17 SO[MO − |M |] (RM)O |U ′|, |m| 〈((u′0,m2), (u′0,m0)),
((u′0,m2), (u′1,m1))〉
〈((u′0,m2), (u′0,m1)),
((u′0,m2), (u′1,m0))〉
P18 SO[MO − |M |] (RM)L (R, |m|) 〈((u′0,m0), (u′1,m1)),
((u′1,m1), (u′0,m0))〉
〈((u′0,m1), (u′1,m0)),
((u′1,m0), (u′0,m1))〉
P7 SO − |U | (SR)O |U ′|, |U | 〈((u0, u′0), (u0, u′0)),
((u0, u′0), (u1, u′1))〉 〈((u0, u′0), (u0, u′1))
((u0, u′0), (u1, u′0))〉
P19 SO − |U | (SM)O |U |, |m| 〈((u0,m2), (u0,m0)),
((u0,m2), (u1,m1))〉
〈((u0,m2), (u0,m1)),
((u0,m2), (u1,m0))〉
P20 SO − P (SM)L P 〈((u0,m2), (u0,m0), (u1,m1)),
((u0,m2), (u1,m1), (u0,m0))〉,
〈((u0,m2), (u0,m1), (u1,m0)),
((u0,m2), (u1,m0), (u0,m1))〉
P ′n Receiver notions analogous analogous
P1 O CO ℵ ((u0)), (♦)
P2 MO[ML] (SR)O Q,Q′ 〈((u0, u′0)), ((u1, u′1))〉 〈((u0, u′1)),
((u1, u′0))〉
P3 MO (SR)L (S,R) 〈((u0, u′0), (u1, u′1)),
((u1, u′1), (u0, u′0))〉
〈((u0, u′1), (u1, u′0)),
((u1, u′0), (u0, u′1))〉
P ′n MO[ML]/ MO −
|M |
Receiver notions analogous
Table 9. Counter example construction idea with X′1 = X1
the adversary wins the game with certainty with this
strategy. Hence, Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π′, (SR)L, c∗, 0)〉] = 1
and Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π′, (SR)L, c∗, 1)〉] = 0 and thus
Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π′, (SR)L, c∗, 0)〉] > e∗ · Pr[0 = 〈A ∣∣
Ch(Π′, (SR)L, c∗, 1)〉] + δ∗ (since 1 > e∗ · 0 + δ∗)
The proofs in Table 10 are done analogously to Lemma
2. This time, analogously proved relations are added in
angle brackets.
P X1 X2 I attack
P10-P15 (2S)L 〈(SM)O,
(SM)L〉
(SR)O 〈(SR)L〉 1. (S,R) 〈((u0, u′0)), ((u1, u′1))〉,
〈((u0, u′1)), ((u1, u′0))〉
P21, P22 (2S)L (SM)O 〈(SM)L〉 1.(S, |m|) 〈((u0,m0)), ((u1,m1))〉,
〈((u0,m1)), ((u1,m0))〉
Pn′ Receiver notions analogous
Table 10. Counter example construction idea with X′1 = CO
Lemma 3. PB. For X1, X2 ∈ {SO, SO− |U |, SO−H,
SO−P , SFL, SFL−H, SFL−P , SML, SML−P}:
If not X1 =⇒ X2 in our hierarchy, (c, , δ) −X1 6=⇒
(c∗, ∗, δ∗) − X2 for any ∗ ≥ 0, δ∗ < 1, c∗ ≥ 1 and for
any  ≥ 0, δ < 1, c ≥ 1.
Proof. If not X1 =⇒ X2 in our hierarchy, then in X1
the adversary is more restricted, i.e. it exists a prop-
erty Prop ∈ {U, |U |, Q,H, P}, which has to be equal in
Fig. 5. The properties at the implication arrows are restricted for
the weaker notion (and all notions those notion implies), but not
for the stronger notion.
both scenarios for X1, but neither has to be equal nor
is implied to be equal for X2 (See Figure 5 to see which
property can be used for which choice of X1 and X2).
We now assume a protocol Π, that achieves (c, , δ)−
X1. Let Π′ be the protocol that additionally publishes
Prop. Π′ still achieves (c, , δ)−X1, since in all attacks
on X1 not more information than in Π are given to the
adversary (The adversary knows Prop already since it is
equal for both scenarios). However, since Prop does not
have to be equal in X2, the adversary can pick the sce-
narios such that it can distinguish them in Π′ based on
Prop with certainty. Hence for an arbitrary ∗ ≥ 0, δ∗ <
1, n∗ = c∗ ≥ 1, Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π′, X2, c∗, 0)〉] = 1
and Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π′, X2, c∗, 1)〉] = 0 and thus
Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π′, X2, c∗, 0)〉] > e∗ · Pr[0 = 〈A ∣∣
Ch(Π′, X2, c∗, 1)〉] + δ∗ (since 1 > e∗ · 0 + δ∗).
Lemma 4. PA. For X2 ∈ {RO,RO − |U ′|, RO − H ′,
RO−P ′, RFL, RFL−H ′, RFL−P ′, RML, RML−P ′},
with X1 6=⇒ X2: (c, , δ) − SO{X1} 6=⇒ (c∗, ∗, δ∗) −
X2 for any ∗ ≥ 0, δ∗ < 1, c∗ ≥ 1 and for any  ≥ 0, δ <
1, c ≥ 1.
Proof. If X1 6=⇒ X2, then it exists a property Prop ∈
{U ′, |U ′|, Q′, H ′, P ′}, which has to be equal in both sce-
narios for X1, but neither has to equal nor is implied to
be equal in X2 (see Proof to Lemma 3 for details).
We now assume a protocol Π, that achieves
((c, , δ)−SO{X1}. Let Π′ be the protocol that addition-
ally outputs Prop. Since the properties of X1 are also
checked in attacks for (c, , δ)− SO{X1} every valid at-
tack on (c, , δ)−SO{X1} will result in the same version
of Prop for both scenarios. Hence, Π′ does not output
new information to the adversary (compared to Π) and
still achieves (c, , δ)− SO{X1}.
However, since Prop does not have to be equal
in X2, the adversary can pick the scenario such that
it can distinguish them with certainty in Π′ based
on Prop. Hence for an arbitrary ∗ ≥ 0, δ∗ <
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1, n∗ = c∗ ≥ 1, Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π′, X2, c∗, 0)〉] = 1
and Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π′, X2, c∗, 1)〉] = 0 and thus
Pr[0 = 〈A
∣∣ Ch(Π′, X2, c∗, 0)〉] > e∗ · Pr[0 = 〈A ∣∣
Ch(Π′, X2, c∗, 1)〉] + δ∗ (since 1 > e∗ · 0 + δ∗).
Lemma 5. (Proofs P23, P ′23, P16) (SM)O 6⇒ (SM)L
((RM)O 6⇒ (RM)L, (SR)O 6⇒ (SR)L analogous)
Proof.
Protocol Construction 1. Given a protocol Π that
achieves (SM)O and does not allow to recognize du-
plicated sender-message pairs, we construct protocol Π′.
Let Π′ run Π and additionally output a bit for every
batch that contains only two communications. For some
fixed senders u0 6= u1 and messages m0 6= m1 the proto-
col will additionally output a bit according to Table 11.
For any other batch with two communications it will pick
the output bit randomly.
(u0,m0) (u1,m0) (u0,m0) (u1,m0)
(u1,m1) (u0,m1) (u0,m0) (u1,m0)
(u1,m1) (u0,m1) (u1,m1) (u0,m1)
(u0,m0) (u1,m0) (u1,m1) (u0,m1)
output 0 output 1 output 1 output 0
Table 11. Additional output of Π′
Protocol Π′ outputs the challenge bit b for (SM)L
and hence does not achieve (SM)L. However, it achieves
(SM)O. The strategy of entering the same challenge row
twice does not work because the advantage gained in
the cases of (SM)L (i.e. a1 6= a2) is annihilated in the
cases of duplicated communications (i.e. a1 = a2). Using
one equal communication in both scenarios and a chal-
lenge row leads to another compensating distribution:
The probability for a correct output is 0.25, for a wrong
output 0.25 and for a random output 0.5. Another at-
tack strategy is not possible since the additional output
is only given for batches of size 2.
Remark. If a protocol does not achieve X2 for c, then
it does not achieve X2 for any c′ > c (because every
attack with only c CR is also valid if more than c CRs
are allowed.) Further, notice that for some notions a
minimum of two CRs is required (e.g. (2S)L)
Additionally, for corruption options: since the pro-
posed attacks do not use any corruption, they are valid
for any corruption option. Analogously, since the pro-
posed attacks do not use different sessions in both sce-
narios, they are valid for any session option.
11 How to Use
The framework described above offers the opportunity
to thoroughly analyze ACNs. To perform such an anal-
ysis, we advice a top-down approach as follows.
1. In case the ACN under analysis can be instantiated
to protect against different adversaries, fix those pa-
rameters.
2. Extract capabilities of the adversary and general
protocol properties from the ACN description: Spec-
ify the allowed user corruption. Is it none, static,
adaptive? See Table 5. Are sessions (channels) con-
structed that link messages from the same sender?
See Section 7.1. Extract all other capabilities to in-
clude them in the protocol model.
3. Simplify the ACN protocol in a protocol model:
Generate a simplified protocol (ideal functional-
ity) without cryptography by assuming secure com-
munication. Show indistinguishability between this
ideal functionality and the real-world protocol using
a simulation based proof. Previous work [1] can guide
the modeling step. See Section 9 (UC-realizability)
for how the result of the simplified protocol can be
transferred to the real-world protocol.
4. Extract properties based upon the input to the ad-
versary from the ideal functionality: Start with sim-
ple properties, see Table 1. What does the adversary
learn from the protocol execution? Continue with
complex properties. See Section 4.2.
5. After mapping all properties from the protocol and
adversary model to our framework, a privacy no-
tions must be selected. Either the description of the
ACN already specifies (in-)formally which privacy
goal should be achieved, or the ACN under analy-
sis should be shown to achieve a certain notion. See
Table 6 for an overview of our defined notions.
6. As it is easier to show that a certain notion is not
fulfilled compared to show that it is fulfilled, we pro-
pose to start with the strongest notions extracted
this way. A notion is not fulfilled if the functional-
ity (and thus the protocol) leaks a property to the
adversary that he is not allowed to learn for the
given notion. If it is not obvious that a notion is not
fulfilled, check if the notion can be proven for the
protocol model. The related work of Gelernter [11]
and Backes [3] serve as examples for such proofs.
If the proof cannot be constructed or δ = 1, a weaker
notion can be selected for analysis. It might also help
to consider the case of a limited number of challenge
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rows (see Section 7.3) and limit the adversary by using a
single-challenge reducable adversary class (see Section 9
Adversary Class). In case the proof goes through and
yields  = 0 and a negligible δ, the protocol was shown
to achieve the selected notion as per Definition 1. If
 > 0 or a non negligible δ < 1, the protocol achieves
the selected notion as per Definition 2.
If the protocol supports different adversaries, the
steps described above can be repeated. This typically
leads to adjusting the ideal functionality or adding dif-
ferent adversary classes (see Section 9) and thus fulfill-
ing different properties of our framework. Analysis re-
sults under a variation of ACN parameters may achieve
different notions in our hierarchy (Figure 6 and Fig-
ure 4). Based on our established relations between no-
tions, analysis results can be compared for various pa-
rameters or parameter ranges, as well as against results
of other ACNs.
12 Discussion
In this section, we present the lessons learned while cre-
ating our framework.
Learning about privacy goals. The need for
formal definitions is emphasized by the mapping of
Loopix’s privacy goals to notions as example that less
formal alternatives leave room for interpretation. Fur-
ther, a result like our hierarchy would be much harder
to achieve without formal definitions.
These definitions allow us to point out the relation
of privacy and confidentiality (MO− |M |). The way we
ordered the notions in the hierarchy allows easy iden-
tification the notions implying MO − |M | (the middle
of the upper part). Note that any privacy notion im-
plying MO − |M | can be broken by distinguishing the
message’s content. Further, nearly all those notions also
implyMO and hence, all such notions can be broken by
learning the message length.
Our formal definitions also enabled the compar-
ison of existing frameworks. Excluding differences in
the adversarial model, quantifications and restrictions
that do not apply to all ACNs, we observe that equiv-
alent definitions are often defined independently by the
authors of the analytical frameworks. For this reason,
we included the notions of the other frameworks in
our hierarchy in Figure 9 of Appendix D. O, SO − P ,
SML−P , RO{SML} and SML are defined (under dif-
ferent names) in multiple works; SO is even defined in
all works.
Although previous work includes equivalent defini-
tions, we realized that some notions are still missing. For
example, we added weak notions like (SM)L, (RM)L
and (SR)L because they match our understanding of
anonymity. Our understanding was confirmed by the
analysis of Loopix’ goals. Further, we defined all anal-
ogous notions for all communication parties involved
(senders and receivers) as real-world application define
which party is more vulnerable. For the concrete appli-
cations we refer the reader to Section 6.1.
Consequently, we present a broad selection of pri-
vacy notions. We are aware that understanding them all
in detail might be a challenging task, so we want to pro-
vide some intuitions and preferences, based on what we
know and conjecture. We expect the lower part of the
hierarchy to be more important for ACNs as [11] already
includes an inefficiency result for SO and thus for all no-
tions implying SO (see Figure 7 of the Appendix). As a
first guess, we think SO, if higher overhead is manage-
able, SFL, SML, (SM)L (and receiver counterparts),
MO− |M | and (SR)L are the most popular notions for
ACNs. Further, we want to add some results concerning
two well-known systems to ease intuition. [3]’s analysis
of Tor results in a small, but non-negligible probability
to break SO and thus Tor does not achieve SO with our
strict definition. Classical DC-Nets, on the other hand,
do achieve at least SO−P [11]. We present our selection
of notions also graphically in Figure 8 of the Appendix.
Correcting Inconsistencies. While the above
similarities most likely stem from the influence of prior
informal work on privacy goals, attempts to provide
concrete mappings have led to contradictions. The
AnoA framework maps its notions to their interpreta-
tion of Pfitzmann and Hansen’s terminology. Pfitzmann
and Hansen match their terminology to the notions of
Hevia’s framework. This means that, notions of AnoA
and Hevia’s framework are indirectly mapped. However,
those notions are not equivalent. While AnoA’s sender
anonymity and Hevia’s sender unlinkability are both
mapped to Pfitzmann and Hansen’s sender anonymity,
they differ: In Hevia’s sender unlinkability the number
of times every sender sends can leak to the adversary,
but in AnoA’s sender anonymity it cannot.
We belive that AnoA’s sender anonymity should be
called sender unobservability, which is also our name
for the corresponding notion. This follows the naming
proposal of Pfitzmann and Hansen and their mapping
to Hevia. It is also more suitable because AnoA’s sender
anonymity can be broken by learning whether a certain
sender is active, i.e. sends a real message, in the system
(u ∈ Ub). In order to achieve this notion, all senders have
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to be unobservable. To verify this, we looked at how the
notions of AnoA have been used. For example in [7] the
protocol model contains an environment that lets all
senders send randomly. Hence, Ub is hidden by the use
of this environment. We consider that the information
that is allowed to be disclosed should instead be part of
the notion and not modified by an environment. Only
then are the notions able to represent what information
is protected by the protocol.
Another lesson learned by comparing privacy no-
tions is the power of names, because they introduce in-
tuitions. The fact that Hevia’s strong sender anonymity
is equivalent to Bohli’s receiver weak unlinkability seems
counter-intuitive, since a sender notion is translated to
a receiver notion. This might also be the reason for
the incorrect mapping in [5]. However, Bohli’s receiver
weak unlinkability is named this way because receivers
are the “interesting” users, whose communication is re-
stricted. It does not restrict senders in any way and
hence should be, in most cases, easier to break accord-
ing to some information about the sender. This is why
we and Hevia have classified it as a sender notion. An
analogous argument explains why Bohli’s receiver weak
anonymity R/WA implies the restricted case of Bohli’s
sender strong anonymity S/SA◦.
Use and Limits. Because there is no restriction
in the use of protocol queries, the only restriction to
what can be analyzed is what is modeled in the pro-
tocol model. So, if the protocol model includes e.g. in-
sider corruption and active behavior of the insider, like
delaying or modifying of messages, those functionality
can be used via protocol queries. The same applies to
timing; if the protocol model specifies that it expects
protocol queries telling it, that x seconds passed and
the adversary gets meaningful answers after this pro-
tocol messages and only an empty answer after batch
queries (because they are only processed after some time
passed), attacks on this can be analyzed. However, it
needs to be specified in the protocol model. This model
also defines the exact meaning of a batch query, whether
messages of one batch are sent at the same time or in
a sequence without interruption and specifies whether a
synchronous or asynchronous communication model is
used.
Defining the protocol model with the strongest ad-
versary imaginable and restricting it later on with ad-
versary classes is a way to limit the work, when ana-
lyzing against different adversary models. We decided
not to increase the complexity of the framework further
by adding interfaces for dimensions of adversary models
to the protocol model, i.e. adding more dedicated query
types instead of the versatile protocol query. So far, our
decisions for query types are driven by the related work.
Differentiating between the different possible use cases
of protocol queries and defining a set of adversary classes
defining typical adversaries based on this is future work.
One of them should allow to limit the amount of cor-
rupted users compared to the amount or honest users
or specify n-1 attacks. Although we presented all no-
tions that we deemed important, there might still be
use cases that are not covered. With our properties as
building blocks, we conjecture that it is easy to add the
needed properties and use them in combination with
ours. Further, for adding new notions to the hierarchy,
our proofs can be used as templates.
Another possible extension is including and extend-
ing more results of the existing frameworks. Such re-
sults are Bohli’s closed hierarchy or Gelernter’s ineffi-
ciency result. Further, in Hevia’s framework techniques
to achieve a stronger ACN are included. For instance,
given an ACN achieving SML adding a certain cover
traffic creates an ACN achieving SO. Those techniques
hide certain information that is allowed to leak in the
weaker but not in the stronger notion. The proof of our
Theorem 6 already includes some information that is al-
lowed to leak in the weaker but not in the stronger no-
tion. Hence, it is a good starting point for finding more
such techniques that help understanding and construct-
ing ACNs better. We make the conjecture that adapting
the proofs of all these results for our framework is pos-
sible. However, at the moment we leave proving of these
results as future work.
13 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a framework of privacy notions for
sharper analysis of ACNs that, to the best of our
knowledge, includes more notions and assumptions than
all existing frameworks based on indistinguishability
games. To achieve this, we expressed privacy goals for-
mally as privacy notions. We first presented their ba-
sic building blocks: properties. Those properties cover
the observable information of communications, which
is either required to remain private or allowed to be
learned by an adversary, depending on the goal. Fur-
thermore, we checked the sanity of the notions by find-
ing exemplary use cases and by providing a mapping of
the privacy goals of a current ACN to them. Our frame-
work allows to compare and understand the differences
in privacy goals. We proved the relations between our
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notions. This means that, for every pair of notions, we
know which one is stronger than the other or if they
are separate. This way, we resolved inconsistencies be-
tween the existing frameworks and built the basis to
understand the strengths and weaknesses of ACNs bet-
ter, which helps building improved ACNs. Further, it
creates a unified basis for the analysis and comparison
of ACNs.
Future Work. Although our framework allows to
analyze all types of attacks with the versatile protocol
queries, the protocol model must support those attacks
without systematic guidance by interfaces of the frame-
work. Restrictions of such attacks thus cannot be ex-
pressed formally as part of the notion and hence are not
easily represented. In future work we want to introduce
more dedicated queries to also formalize other attack di-
mensions and based on this adversary classes for typical
attackers. As we mentioned in the discussion, providing
more intuitions and understanding the significance of
notions is necessary. Therefore, analogous to the anal-
ysis of Loopix’s privacy goals, more current ACNs can
be analyzed to understand which parts of the hierarchy
they cover. This can also identify gaps in research; pri-
vacy goals for which ACNs are currently missing. Fur-
ther, a survey of goals in greater depth would be useful
to identify the most important notions in the hierarchy
and to provide intuitions and thus ease deciding on the
correct notions for practitioners.
Additionally, such a survey helps to understand the
relationships between currently-employed privacy en-
hancing technologies. Finally, this understanding and
the knowledge about how notions are related and differ
can be used to define general techniques that strengthen
ACNs.
Beyond that, an investigation of the applicability
of our framework to other areas, like e.g. anonymous
payment channels, would be interesting.
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A Challenger
This section describes the queries to the challenger
Ch(Π, X, c, n, b). Pseudocode of our challenger is shown
in Algorithm 1 of Appendix A.
Batch Query. The batches r0, r1 that the ad-
versary chooses for the two scenarios are represented
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in batch queries. When the challenger receives a batch
query, it will first check if their challenge number Ψ is
valid, i.e. Ψ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Further, the challenger will
validate the communications that would be input to Π
for b = 0 and b = 1 as explained below. If the game is
not aborted so far, the challenger will retrieve or create
the current state s of the challenge Ψ, which stores in-
formation to calculate the aspects. Afterwards it checks
if the allowed total number of challenge rows c is met. If
all criteria are met so far, it checks that the aspects of
the privacy notion X are met by using the current state
of the challenge s , the set of corrupted users Uˆ ,the in-
stances for both scenarios r0a, ra1, a ∈ {0, 1}. Finally,
it runs the instance belonging to the challenge bit b of
this game and the for this challenge randomly chosen
instance bit a, if the aspects are matched. Otherwise, it
returns ⊥ and aborts the experiment. Running the sce-
nario in the ACN protocol will return information that
is forwarded to the adversary(or adversary class). This
information is what an adversary is assumed to be able
to observe.
Corrupt Query. Corrupt queries represent adap-
tive, momentary corruption of users (senders or re-
ceivers). If the corrupt query is valid, the challenger
forwards it to the ACN protocol. The ACN protocol
returns the current state of the user to the challenger,
who forwards it to the adversary. Active attacks based
on corruption are realized with protocol queries if the
protocol model allows for them.
Protocol Query. Protocol queries allow the ad-
versary e.g. to compromise parts of the network(not
the users), set parameters of the ACN protocol or use
other functionalities modeled in the protocol model, like
e.g. active attacks. The meaning and validity of those
queries is specific to the analyzed ACN protocol.
Switch Stage Query. If this query occurs and it
is allowed, i.e. the notion contains a relevant property,
the stage is changed from 1 to 2.
Validate Communications. If the analyzed ACN
protocol specifies restrictions of senders and receiver-
message pairs, their validity is checked by this function.
Run Protocol. Run protocol first creates a new
random session identifier if there is not already one for
this session identifier of the adversary chosen session
with the extension ID. This is done to ensure that the
ACN protocol is not broken only because the session
identifier is leaked. Afterwards it passes the communi-
cations to the ACN protocol formalization.
Remark to simple properties and instances.
In case the notion only uses simple properties, the chal-
lenger will pick a = 0 and check the properties for
r1j = r
0
1j
and r0j = r
0
0j
. In case the notion uses a combi-
nation of simple and complex properties, the challenger
will check the simple properties for any pair r1j = r
a
1 j
and r0j = r
a′
0 j
resulting by any a, a′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Algorithm 1: Challenger Ch(Π, X, c, n, b)
Uˆ = ∅
stage = 1
Upon query (Batch, r00, r
1
0, r
0
1, r
1
1,Ψ)
if Ψ /∈ {1, . . . , n} then
output ⊥
if Ψ ∈ T then
Retrieve s := sΨ
else
s := initializeState
if X uses only simple properties then
a← 0
else
a←R {0, 1}
add Ψ to T
if ¬V alidate(r) then
output ⊥
Compute ct = ct + |CR(r00, r10, r01, r11)|
if ct > c then
output ⊥
s′ = calculateNewState(stage, s, r00, r
1
0, r
0
1, r
1
1))
if checkFor(X,Ψ, s′, Uˆ , r0 = (r
0
0, r
1
0), r1 = (r
0
1, r
1
1)) then
(r, sΨ)← (rab , s′)
else
output ⊥
Store sΨ
RunProtocol (r)
Upon query (Protocol, x)
if x allowed then
Send x to Π
Upon query (Corrupt, u)
if X= X′c0 (X
′ ∈ Privacy notions) then
output ⊥
if X= X′c− (X
′ ∈ Privacy notions) and a batch query
occurred before and u /∈ Uˆ then
output ⊥
Uˆ= Uˆ ∪ {u}
Send internal state of u to A
Upon query (SwitchStage)
if ¬X includes TS or TR then
output ⊥
stage = 2
Validate (r00 = (S
0
0i
, R00i
,m00i
, aux00i
)i∈{1,...,l}, r10, r
0
1, r
1
1)
for r = (S,R,m, aux) ∈ {ra′
b′ | a′, b′ ∈ {0, 1}} do
if ¬V alidate(S,R,m) then
output FALSE
output TRUE
Run Protocol (r = (Si, Ri,mi, auxi)i∈{1,...,l})
for ri ∈ r do
if auxi = (sessioni, IDi) then
if 6 ∃y : (session, y, IDi) ∈ Si then
y′ ← {0, 1}k
Store (session, y′, ID) in Si
else
y′ := y from (session, y, IDi) ∈ Si
Run Π on ri with session ID y′
Forward responses sent by Π to A
else
Run Π on ri
Forward responses sent by Π to A
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B Notions in Pseudocode
CalcNewState always calculates the states for all user
roles (senders and receivers). This is for improved read-
ability. It would be sufficient to calculate the parts of
the state needed for the current notion.
Algorithm 2: State Management
initializeState
s = (1, 1, (s˜, s˜, s˜, s˜, r˜, r˜, r˜, r˜), 0, ∅, ∅)
return s
calcNewState (newStage, s = (stage, session, users, cr,
ssender = (L00i , L
1
0i , L
0
1i , L
1
1i )i∈{1,...,k−1},
srec = (L′00i , L
′1
0i , L
′0
1i , L
′1
1i )i∈{1,...,k−1}),
r00 = (S00i , R
0
0i ,m
0
0i , aux
0
0i )i∈{1,..,l},
r10 = (S10i , R
1
0i ,m
1
0i , aux
1
0i )i∈{1,..,l},
r01 = (S01i , R
0
1i ,m
0
1i , aux
0
1i )i∈{1,..,l}),
r11 = (S11i , R
1
1i ,m
1
1i , aux
1
1i )i∈{1,..,l})
for a ∈ {0, 1} do
for b ∈ {0, 1} do
Labk
= {(u,M)
∣∣ M = ∪j:Sa
bj
=um
a
bi
}
L′abk = {(u,M)
∣∣ M = ∪j:Ra
bj
=um
a
bi
}
cr = cr + |CR(r00, r10, r01, r11)|
if users=(s˜, s˜, s˜, s˜, r˜, r˜, r˜, r˜) ∧ cr > 0 then
((S00 , R00,_,_), (S10 , R10,_,_), (S01 , R0, _,_),
(S11 , R11,_,_), . . . ) = CR(r00, r10, r01, r11)
users= (S00 , S10 , S01 , S11 , R00, R10, R01, R11)
if users= (S00 , S10 , S01 , S11 , R00, R10, R01, R11)
∧∃(r00 , r10 , r01 , r11) ∈ CR(r00, r10, r01, r11) :
(r00 , r10 , r01 , r11) 6= ((S00 , R00,_,_,_), (S10 , R10,_,_,_),
(S01 , R01,_,_,_), (S11 , R11,_,_,_)) then
session=⊥
stage = newStage
output s
For the simple properties checkFor uses s0bk from
ssender resp. s′0bk from srec to calculate Ub, Qb, Pb and Hb
and compares them like in Definition 8. For the complex
properties the senders and receivers of the first challenge
row are stored in the users-part and the current stage
in the stage-part of s. With this complex properties are
computed as stated in Definition 10. Further, for the
sessions-aspect the session-part of the state is set to ⊥
if another sender-receiver-pair is used. With this and
the users− and stage-information the Definition 13 can
be checked. For the corruption it gets all the required
information direct as input and can check it like de-
fined in Definition 15. For the challenge complexity the
number of challenge rows of this challenge is counted in
the cr-part of the state and hence, Definition 16 can be
calculated.
C Additional Tables and Lists
Symbol Description
U/U ′ Who sends/receives is equal for both scenarios.
Q/Q′ Which sender/receiver sends/receives how often is equal
for both scenarios.
H/H′ How many senders/receivers send/receive how often is
equal for both scenarios.
P/P ′ Which messages are sent/received from the same
sender/receiver is equal for both scenarios.
|U |/|U ′| How many senders/receivers communicate is equal for
both scenarios.
|M | Messages in the two scenarios always have the same length.
ES Everything but the senders is identical in both scenarios.
ER, EM analogous
ESM Everything but the senders and messages is identical in
both scenarios.
ERM , ESR analogous
ℵ nothing will be checked; always true
E♦ If something is sent in both scenarios, the communication
is the same.
♦6 In every communication something must be sent.
RSR Adversary picks two sender-receiver-pairs. One of the
senders and one of the receivers is chosen randomly. For
b=0 one of the adversary chosen sender-receiver pairs is
drawn. For b=1 the sender is paired with the receiver of
the other pair.
RSM , RRM analogous
TS Adversary picks two senders. The other sender might send
the second time (stage 2). For b=0 the same sender sends
in both stages, for b=1 each sender sends in one of the
stages.
TR analogous
MSR Adversary picks two sender-receiver-pairs. Sender-receiver-
pairs might be mixed. For b=0 both adversary chosen
sender-receiver-pairs communicate. For b=1 both mixed
sender-receiver-pairs communicate.
MSM ,MRM analogous
Table 12. Properties
Symbol Description
A Adversary
Ch Challenger
Π ACN protocol model
b ∈ {0, 1} Challenge bit
g ∈ {0, 1} Adversary’s guess
r0 = (r01 , r02 , . . . , r0l) Batch of communications
rbi ∈ {♦, (u, u′,m, aux)} Communication
♦ Nothing is communicated
(u, u′,m, aux) m is sent from u to u′ with auxiliary
information aux
(r01 , . . . , r0k) (First) Scenario
⊥ Abort game
CR(r0, r1) Challenge rows of batches r0, r1
Ψ Challenge Number
#cr Number of challenge rows allowed in
challenge
n Number of challenges allowed
c Number of challenge rows allowed in
game
Uˆ Set of corrupted users
U Set of possible senders
U ′ Set of possible receivers
Table 13. Symbols used in the Game
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Symbol Description
SO{RO − |U ′|} Sender/Message Unobservability with Receiver Unobservability
leaking User Number
SO{RO −H′} Sender/Message Unobservability with Receiver Unobservability
leaking Histogram
SO{RO − P ′} Sender/Message Unobservability with Receiver Unobservability
leaking Pseudonym
SO{RFL} Sender/Message Unobservability with Receiver-Frequency Un-
linkability
SO{RFL−H′} Sender/Message Unobservability with Receiver-Frequency Un-
linkability leaking Histogram
SO{RFL− P ′} Sender/Message Unobservability with Receiver-Frequency Un-
linkability leaking Pseudonym
SO{RML} Sender/Message Unobservability with Receiver-Message Un-
linkability
SO{RML− P ′} Sender/Message Unobservability with Receiver-Message Un-
linkability leaking Pseudonym
SO Sender Unobservability
SO − |U | Sender Unobservability leaking User Number
SO −H Sender Unobservability leaking Histogram
SO − P Sender Unobservability leaking Pseudonym
SFL Sender-Frequency Unlinkability
SFL−H Sender-Frequency Unlinkability leaking Histogram
SFL− P Sender-Frequency Unlinkability leaking Pseudonym
SML Sender-Message Unlinkability
SML− P Sender-Message Unlinkability leaking Pseudonym
SO[MO − |M |] Sender Unobservability with Message Unobservability leaking
Message Length
(2S)L Twice Sender Unlinkability
(SM)O Sender-Message Pair Unobservability
(SM)L Sender-Message Pair Unlinkability
SO
′ Restricted Sender Unobservability
Receiver notions analogous
CO Communication Unobservability
O Unobservability
(SR)O Sender-Receiver Unobservability
MO[ML] Message Unobservability with Message Unlinkability
MO − |M | Message Unobservability leaking Message Length
(SR)L Sender-Receiver Pair Unlinkability
X notion, standard assumptions
X adaptive corruption
Xc0 No corruption of users is allowed.
Xc− Only static corruption of users is allowed.
Xcsr Corrupted users are not allowed to be chosen as senders or
receivers.
Xcs Corrupted users are not allowed to be senders.
Xcr Corrupted users are not allowed to be receivers.
Xce Corrupted nodes send/receive identical messages in both sce-
narios.
X Communication of corrupted users not restricted.
Xs Sender and receiver of challenge rows stay the same for this
challenge and stage.
X Sessions are not restricted.
XCR#cr c communications in the two scenarios are allowed to differ.
Table 14. Notions and Restriction Options
D Hierarchy And Tables
On the next page the hierarchy can be found combined
with the symbol tables (Fig. 6 and Tables of 15). Fur-
ther, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 highlight special parts of the hi-
erarchy and Fig. 9 presents the mapping of the notions
of the other frameworks to ours.
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Receiver Privacy Notions Sender Privacy Notions
Both-side
Unobservability
Both-side Unlinkability
Both-side
Unlinkability
Both-side Unlinkability
Sender-
Receiver
Linkability
Message
Observability
Sender-Message Linkability
Sender Observability
Receiver-Message Linkability
Receiver Observability
Impartial Notions
Fig. 6. Our new hierarchy of privacy notions divided into sender, receiver and impartial notions and clustered by leakage type.
Usage Explanation
D ∈ {S,R,M} Dimension ∈ {Sender, Receiver,
Message}
Dimension D
not mentioned
Dimension can leak
Dimension D
mentioned
Protection focused on this dimension ex-
ists
DO not even the participating items regarding
D leak,(e.g. SO: not even U leaks)
DFL participating items regarding D can leak,
but not which exists how often (e.g. SFL:
U leaks, but not Q)
DML participating items regarding D and how
often they exist can leak ( e.g. SML:
U,Q leaks)
X − Prop, like X but additionally Prop can leak
Prop ∈ {|U |,H,
P, |U ′|,H′, P ′, |M |}
(D1D2)O uses RD1D2 ; participating items regard-
ing D1, D2 do not leak, (e.g. (SR)O:
RSR)
(D1D2)L uses MD1D2 ; participating items regard-
ingD1, D2 can leak, (e.g. (SR)L:MSR)
(2D)L uses TD; it can leak whether two partic-
ipating item regarding D are the same,
(e.g. (2S)L: TS)
O short for SOROMO
MO[ML] short for MO(SML,RML)
SO{X} short for SOMOX
D1X1[D2X2] D1 is dominating dimension, usually D1
has more freedom, i.e. X2 is a weaker
restriction than X1
CO nothing can leak (not even the existence
of any communication)
(a) Naming Scheme
Notion Properties
(SR)L ♦6 ∧ESR ∧MSR
(SR)O ♦6 ∧ESR ∧RSR
MO ♦6 ∧EM
MO − |M | ♦6 ∧EM ∧ |M |
MO[ML] ♦6 ∧Q ∧Q′
O ♦6
CO ℵ
SO ♦6 ∧ES
SO − |U | ♦6 ∧ES ∧ |U |
SO −H ♦6 ∧ES ∧H
SO − P ♦6 ∧ES ∧ P
SFL ♦6 ∧ES ∧ U
SFL−H ♦6 ∧ES ∧ U ∧H
SFL− P ♦6 ∧ES ∧ U ∧ P
SML ♦6 ∧ES ∧Q
SML− P ♦6 ∧ES ∧Q ∧ P
(2S)L ♦6 ∧ES ∧ TS
RO etc. analogous
SO[MO] ♦6 ∧ESM
SO[MO − |M |] ♦6 ∧ESM ∧ |M |
(SM)O ♦6 ∧ESM ∧RSM
(SM)L ♦6 ∧ESM ∧MSM
RO[MO − |M |]
etc.
analogous
SO{X′} Properties of X′, remove
ER
for X′ ∈ {RO, RO − |U ′|, RO −
H′, RO − P ′, RFL,RFL −H′,
RFL− P ′, RML, RML− P ′}
RO{X′} analogous, remove ES
(b) Definition of the no-
tions for all corruption options
as defined in Table 5. A de-
scription of simple properties
was given in Table 1.
Symbol Description
U/U ′ Who sends/receives is equal for both scenarios.
Q/Q′ Which sender/receiver sends/receives how often is equal for both sce-
narios.
H/H′ How many senders/receivers send/receive how often is equal for both
scenarios.
P/P ′ Which messages are sent/received from the same sender/receiver is
equal for both scenarios.
|U |/|U ′| How many senders/receivers communicate is equal for both scenarios.
|M | Messages in the two scenarios always have the same length.
ES Everything but the senders is identical in both scenarios.
ER, EM analogous
ESM Everything but the senders and messages is identical in both scenarios.
ERM , ESR analogous
ℵ nothing will be checked; always true
E♦ If something is sent in both scenarios, the communication is the same.
♦6 In every communication something must be sent.
RSR Adversary picks two sender-receiver-pairs. One of the senders and one
of the receivers is chosen randomly. For b=0 one of the adversary
chosen sender-receiver pairs is drawn. For b=1 the sender is paired
with the receiver of the other pair.
RSM , RRM analogous
TS Adversary picks two senders. The other sender might send the second
time (stage 2). For b=0 the same sender sends in both stages, for b=1
each sender sends in one of the stages.
TR analogous
MSR Adversary picks two sender-receiver-pairs. Sender-receiver-pairs might
be mixed. For b=0 both adversary chosen sender-receiver-pairs com-
municate. For b=1 both mixed sender-receiver-pairs communicate.
MSM ,MRM analogous
(c) Properties
Table 15. Tables for our naming scheme (a), notion definitions (b) and property definitions (c)
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Receiver Privacy Notions Sender Privacy NotionsImpartial Notions
Fig. 7. Protocols for notions highlighted are inefficient due to a result by Gelernter [11].
Receiver Privacy Notions Sender Privacy NotionsImpartial Notions
Fig. 8. Depicted notions are a first guess on which notions might be important based on informal and formal usage in the related work.
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Fig. 9. Our hierarchy with the mapping to other works (Bohli’s, AnoA, Hevia’s, Gelernter’s framework, Loopix’s ACN and new notions)
